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INTRODUCTION
This  Article  analyzes  the  treatment  in  bankruptcy  of  a
debtor's  "executory  contracts"-contracts  under  which  the  debtor
still  owes (or is owed) performance  at the time the debtor files for
bankruptcy.  Under  the  laws  of most  countries, including  the Unit-
ed States,  the bankruptcy trustee  generally  disposes  of an executo-
ry contract  in one of two ways:  she either 1) seeks performance  of
the contract;  or 2)  "rejects"  the contract, in which  case  any result-
ing damage  claim  is  treated  as  a prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim.'
Since  such  claims  are  typically  paid  only  a  fraction  of their  face
amount,  the usual consequence  of rejection is that an injured party
receives  much less than full compensation.
The  Article  explains  that the ability of the bankruptcy  trustee
to  reject  executory  contracts  without  fully  compensating  the  in-
t  John  M.  Olin  Research  Fellow  in  Law,  Economics,  and  Business,  Harvard  Law
School.  I would  like  to thank  Lucian  Bebchuk, Lisa  Bernstein,  Bernie  Black,  Dan  Bussel,
Naomi  Fried,  Jeff  Gordon,  Mark  Grady,  Howell  Jackson,  Hideki  Kanda,  Louis  Kaplow,
Ken  Klee,  Mitch  Polinsky,  Alan  Schwartz,  Elizabeth  Warren  and  seminar  participants  at
the  University  of California  at Berkeley,  the  California Institute  of Technology,  Columbia,
Harvard,  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Stanford,  the  University  of  California  at  Los
Angeles,  the  University  of Southern  California,  and  the  1996  ALEA  Conference  in  Chi-
cago  for  helpful  comments.  I  also  would  like  to  thank  Teresa  Sullivan,  Jay  Westbrook,
and  Elizabeth  Warren  for  permission  to  use  bankruptcy  case  data  from  their  Business
Bankruptcy  Project,  a  study  funded  by  the  National  Endowment  of the  National  Confer-
ence  of Bankruptcy  Judges  (with  supplemental  funding  from  other  sources).  Maria  Vinall
of the  Business  Bankruptcy  Project provided  valuable  technical  assistance  in  accessing  the
data.  The  financial  support  of the  John  M.  Olin  Center  for  Law,  Economics,  and  Busi-
ness  at Harvard  Law  School  is  also  gratefully  acknowledged.
This  Article  is  part  of a  larger  project  on the  distribution  of a  debtor's bankruptcy
estate  among  its  creditors.  An  earlier  Article  focused  on  the  division  of  value  between
secured  and  unsecured  creditors.  See Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  &  Jesse  M.  Fried,  The  Un-
easy  Case for the  Priority of Secured  Claims in  Bankruptcy,  105  YALE  L.J.  857  (1996).
This  is  the  first  of  two  Articles  that  will  examine  the  treatment  of  parties  whose  con-
tracts  with  the debtor  are  still  executory  when  the  debtor  files  for  bankruptcy.  Another
Article  will  focus  on  the  division  of value  among  unsecured  creditors.
1.  See 11  U.S.C.  § 365(a)  (1994).518  DUKE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 46:517
jured  party  can  give  the  bankruptcy  trustee  an incentive  to  reject
value-creating contracts  that, from an efficiency perspective,  should
be performed.  The Article then puts forward for consideration  and
analyzes  a  variety  of arrangements  designed  to  eliminate  this  dis-
tortion, including  three rules  that adjust the contract price in favor
of the bankruptcy  estate.2
A  bankruptcy  filing  automatically  creates  a  separate  legal
entity-the  "bankruptcy  estate."3   The  debtor's  assets  become
property  of the estate  and  are  managed  by  the  bankruptcy  trust-
ee.4  The  debtor's  liabilities  are  converted  into  claims  against  the
estate.'  An important purpose of the bankruptcy  proceeding  is  to
preserve the business'  value as  a going  concern,  if any.'  The  trust-
ee  also  has  a  duty  to  maximize  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured
claims,7  whether  the  business  is  ultimately  liquidated,  sold  as  a
going concern to a third party, or reorganized
Most  debtors  enter  bankruptcy  with  some  contracts  that  are
still  "executory."9  Depending  on  its  terms,  an  executory  contract
2.  As  George Triantis  has observed,  the problem  of excessive  breach  arises not  only
in  bankruptcy  but  whenever  a  promisor  is  insolvent  and  damage  claims  arising  out  of
breach  are  not paid  in  full.  See George  G.  Triantis,  The  Effects  of Insolvency  and Bank-
ruptcy  on  Contract Performance and  Adjustment,  43  U.  ToRoNTo  L.J.  679  (1993).
Triantis'  solution  to  the  problem  of  excessive  rejection  in  bankruptcy,  which  is  different
from  the  arrangements  put  forward  here,  is  discussed  and  analyzed  infra  notes  104-07
and  accompanying  text.
3.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 541(a)  (1994).
4.  The  trustee  is  an individual  appointed  to  administer  the  estate  of the  debtor.  See
11  U.S.C.  §§  1104,  1302.  In  Chapter  11  reorganization  proceedings,  the  estate  is  usually
managed  by  the  debtor's  management,  as  "debtor-in-possession"  ("DIP"),  which  has  the
same  powers  and  duties  as  a  trustee.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 1107.  However,  for  convenience  I
will  use the  term  "bankruptcy  trustee"  to  refer to  the  person(s)  managing  the  bankruptcy
estate.
5.  See  11  U.S.C.  §§  501-60  (1994).
6.  See  Raymond  T. Nimmer,  Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fun-
damental Terms of the Bargain, 54  U.  COLO.  L.  REv.  507,  509  (1983);  Elizabeth  Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in  an Imperfect  World, 92  MICH.  L. REv.  336,  350  (1993).
7.  See  Steven  J. Wadyka,  Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Section 365, 3
BANK.  DEv. J. 217,  224-25  (1986).
8.  See  Jay  Lawrence  Westbrook,  A  Functional Analysis  of Executory  Contracts, 74
MINN.  L. REV.  227, 231-32  (1989).  In practice,  a trustee  may seek  to  preserve her job  or
advance  the  interests  of a  particular  class  of claimants  at  the  expense  of maximizing  the
value  of the  estate  as  a  whole.  See Lynn  M. LoPucki  &  William  C. Whitford,  Corporate
Governance in the  Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held  Companies, 141  U.
PA.  L.  REV.  669,  671-72,  683-88  (1993).  The  assumption  that  the  trustee  seeks  to  maxi-
mize  the  payout  rate  for unsecured  claims  is made  for  convenience  and  is  not  critical  to
the  analysis.
9.  See  Nimmer,  supra note  6,  at 512.  The  results  of an informal  study  of bankrupt-19961  EXECUTORY CONTRACTS  IN BANKRUPTCY  519
can  be  an  asset  or  liability  to  the  debtor's  estate." 0  Unlike  ordi-
nary  assets,  executory  contracts  do  not  automatically  enter  the
estate.  Instead,  Section  365  of the Bankruptcy  Code  provides  the
trustee  with  a  choice:  she  can  either  "assume"  or  "reject"  the
executory  contract."  If  the  executory  contract  is  assumed,  the
debtor's  estate  becomes  bound  to  it."  If the  executory  contract  is
rejected, the rejection is  treated  as a prebankruptcy  breach by the
debtor (not the bankruptcy  estate). As a result, claims for damages
arising  from  rejection  are  treated  as  any  other  general  pre-
bankruptcy unsecured  claims against  the debtor:  they share ratably
in  the  assets  available  to  pay  general  unsecured  creditors. 13  Be-
cause  general  unsecured  creditors  in  most  U.S.  bankruptcies  are
generally  paid  only  a fraction  of  their claims,'4  the usual effect  of
the  current  rule-which  I  call  the  "ratable  damages"  ("RD")
rule-is  to  enable  the  bankruptcy  estate  to  benefit  from  the
cy  case  data  that  I  conducted  are  consistent  with  Nimmer's  observation.  See  infra note
21.
10.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  Builder  contracts  to build a  factory  for  Firm  for $100,
and  Builder  has not yet  constructed  the  factory.  If Firm enters  bankruptcy  before  Builder
has  constructed  the  factory  or  Firm  has  paid  Builder  $100,  and  Firm's  bankruptcy  estate
values  the  factory  at  $120,  Firm's  right  under  the  contract  to  pay  Builder  $100  for  the
factory  represents  an  asset  to  the  estate  worth  $20  ($120  - $100).  If, on  the  other  hand,
Firm's estate  values the  factory  at only  $80,  the  obligation  to  pay  Builder  $100  represents
a  liability  to  the  estate  of  $20  ($100  - $80).
11.  See 11  U.S.C.  § 365(a)  (authorizing  the  trustee  to  accept  or  reject  contracts  sub-
ject to  court  approval).
12.  In  certain  cases,  the  trustee  may  "assign"  an  assumed  contract  to  a  third  party.
See  infra note  41.
13.  I  assume  that  the  nonbankrupt  party  is  unsecured  and  not  entitled  to  specific
performance  or  any other  type  of injunctive  relief.
14.  See,  ag.,  Lynn  M.  LoPucki,  A  General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Rem-
edies/Bankruptcy System,  1982  Wis.  L.  REv.  311,  311  (finding  that  average  payout  prom-
ised-but  not necessarily  paid-to general  unsecured  creditors  in  reorganization  cases  was
about  30  cents  on  the  dollar).  In  a  more  recent  study  of the  reorganizations  of  large,
publicly  traded  corporations-where  payout  rates  are  generally  the  highest-the  average
payout  was  slightly  less than  50  cents  on  the  dollar. See  Lynn  M.  LoPucki  &  William  C.
Whitford,  Bargaining Over  Equity's  Share  in  the  Bankruptcy  Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held  Companies, 139  U. PA.  L.  REv. 125,  142  (1990).  However,  the payout  rate
to  ordinary  unsecured  creditors  in  liquidation  bankruptcies  (which  make  up  the  over-
whelming  majority  of  bankruptcy  cases)  is  on  average  less  than  5%.  See  eg.,  LoPucki,
supra, at 311  (finding  that  80%  of business  liquidations  in  bankruptcy  yielded  no  distri-
bution  to  general  creditors;  among  those  liquidations  where  there  was  a  payout,  general
creditors  received  on  average  4.5  cents  on  the  dollar);  Michelle  J.  White,  Bankruptcy,
Liquidation,  and  Reorganization, in  HANDBOOK  OF  MODERN  FINANcE  E7-1,  E7-34
(Dennis  E. Logue  ed.,  3d  ed.  1994)  (reporting  that in  a  sample of small  firms liquidating
in  bankruptcy  under Chapter  7,  the  expected  payout rate  was  4%).520  DUKE LAW JO URNAL  [Vol. 46:517
debtor's favorable  contracts  while dramatically reducing the cost of
unburdening itself from the debtor's most unfavorable  contracts." 5
Section  365  has  been  invoked  by  parties  ranging  from  the
actress  Tia  Carrere,  who  filed for  bankruptcy  in  order  to  reject a
contract  to  act in  "General  Hospital"  so  that she  could  appear  in
another  TV  show,  "The  A-Team,' 16  to  Continental  Airlines,
which  sought  to  reject  a collective  bargaining  agreement  with  one
of its  unions. 7  However,  most  Section  365  proceedings  appear  to
involve  small  to medium-sized  businesses  seeking  to reject  garden-
variety  commercial  contracts,  such  as leases, licenses,  and purchase
and sale  agreements. 8
The  use  of  Section  365  to  reject  unfavorable  contracts  has
become  increasingly  widespread. 9  Indeed,  it  is  believed  that
thousands  of bankruptcy  cases  are filed  each year  for the  primary
purpose  of rejecting  executory  contracts. 0  However,  most  execu-
tory  contracts  are  rejected  in  cases  that  were  probably  filed  for
other reasons.
15.  The  loss  from  performance  of  an  unfavorable  executory  contract  may  be  less
than the  ratable  damages  that  would  be paid  to  the  other party  in the  event  of rejection.
In  such  a  case,  (existing)  unsecured  creditors  would  be  better  off  if  the  contract  is  per-
formed.
16.  See  In re Carrere,  64  B.R.  156,  157  (Bankr.  C.D.  Cal.  1986).
17.  See  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 229  n.4  (1989)  (citing  In re Continental  Airlines
Corp.,  38  B.R.  67,  71-72  (Bankr.  S.D. Tex.  1984)).
18.  See  infra notes  42-50  and  accompanying  text.
19.  See  Westbrook,  supra note 8,  at  229.
20.  See  iL
21.  Contracts  are  automatically  deemed  rejected  in  Chapter 7  liquidation  proceedings
unless  the  trustee  seeks  permission  to  assume  the  contract  within  60  days  of the  order
for  relief,  apparently  even  when  the  business  is  being  sold  as  a  going  concern.  See  11
U.S.C.  § 365(d)(1)  (1994).  In  Chapter  11,  where  the  trustee  generally  may  assume  or  re-
ject  an  executory  contract  any  time  before  the  confirmation  of  the  plan,  see  11  U.S.C.
§ 365(d)(2),  the proposal  for rejecting  an  executory  contract  is  often  found  in  the plan  it-
self. The  court's  confirmation  of the  plan  has  the  effect  of approving  the  rejection.
With  the  exception  of several  case  studies  of large  business  bankruptcies,  there  is
little  data  available  on  business  bankruptcy  (including  the  frequency  with  which  business
debtors  reject  contracts  under  § 365).  See  Elizabeth  Warren  & Jay  Lawrence  Westbrook,
Searching for Reorganization  Realities, 72  WASH.  U.  L.Q.  1257,  1258  n.1  (1994).  This  will
soon  change.  Teresa  Sullivan,  Elizabeth  Warren,  and  Jay  Westbrook  are  currently  gath-
ering  and  analyzing  data  from  bankruptcy  cases  filed  in  23  federal  districts  in  1994  as
part of  their Business  Bankruptcy  Project.  For a  description  of the  Project's  methodology,
see  Teresa  A.  Sullivan,  Methodological Realities: Social  Science  Methods  and Business
Reorganizations, 72  VAsH.  U.  L.Q.  1291  (1994).
To  obtain  a  rough  estimate  of the  frequency  of contract  rejection  in  bankruptcy,  I
examined  twenty  Chapter  7  cases  and twenty-seven  Chapter  11  cases  that  were  randomly
drawn  from  a sample  of business  bankruptcy  cases  that had  been  collected  by  the Project1996]  EXECUTORY CONTRACTS  IN BANKRUPTCY  521
As  the  use  of  Section  365  has  grown,  its  application  has
drawn  strong  criticism  from  both  the  business  community  and
academic  commentators.  Much  of  this  criticism  has  focused  on
cases  in which  the  courts  have  held  that the  effect  of rejection  is
to return the parties  to the same  position they  were  in before the
contract  was  signed.'  In  Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc.  v.  Richmond
Metal Finishers,  Inc.,24 for example,  the Fourth  Circuit  held that  a
technology  licensor  that  had  filed  for  bankruptcy  not  only  could
breach  its  continuing  obligations  under  the license  agreement,  but
could  cancel the license  altogether,  thereby forcing  the licensee  to
give up its rights to  the technology.'
The furor  caused  by Lubrizol led  Congress  to  amend  Section
365  in  order  to  clarify  that rejection  of  a technology  license  does
not cancel  the  license,  but  only releases  the  estate  from  perform-
ing  its  affirmative  obligations  under  the  agreement. 26  Unfortu-
nately,  Congress  has  not  yet  clarified  the  effect  of  rejection  on
other  sorts  of contracts,  including  ordinary  personal  property  leas-
es  and  copyright  agreements.  As  a  result,  much  of  the  jurispru-
dence  relating  to  Section  365  continues  to  be  controversial,  and
there  are  calls for a complete  overhaul  of the statute. 7
for study.  Of the  twenty  debtors  whose  bankruptcy  proceedings  commenced  under  Chap-
ter  7  ("Chapter  7  debtors"),  eleven  (55%)  were  party  to  at least  one  executory  contract.
Of  the  eleven  Chapter  7  debtors  entering  bankruptcy  with  at  least  one  executory  con-
tract, six  (55%)  were party to  only  one  contract  and  five  (45%)  were party  to more  than
one  executory  contract.  Seven  of the  eleven  cases  in which  there  was  at least  one  execu-
tory  contract  had  been  completed  at  the  time  of the  survey;  it  appeared  that  all  of the
contracts  in  these  seven  cases  had  been  automatically  rejected  or  rejected  by motion  of
the  debtor.
Of  the  twenty-seven  debtors  whose  bankruptcy  proceedings  commenced  under
Chapter  11  ("Chapter  11  debtors"),  nineteen  (70%)  were  party  to  at least  one  executory
contract. Of the  nineteen  Chapter  11  debtors  entering  bankruptcy  with  at  least  one  exec-
utory  contract,  four (21%)  were  party  to  only  one  contract  and  fifteen  (79%)  were  party
to  more than  one  contract.  Of the  four  cases  involving  single-contract  Chapter  11  debt-
ors, three  had  been  completed  or  dismissed.  In  each  of those  three  cases,  the  executory
contract  was  assumed  (or, in  some  of the  dismissed  cases,  not  rejected).  Of the  fifteen
cases  involving  multiple-contract  Chapter  11  debtors,  eight  had  been  completed  or  dis-
missed.  In  three  of  those  cases,  all  of the  contracts  had  been  rejected.  In  the other  five
multiple-contract  Chapter  11  cases,  at least  one  contract  had  been  assumed.
22.  See,  e.g.,  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 228-29.
23.  See  id. at  306-07.  The injured  party  is,  however,  allowed  to  sue  for any  resulting
damages.
24.  756  F.2d  1043  (4th  Cir.  1985).
25.  See  id. at 1047-48.
26.  See  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 307;  11  U.S.C.  § 365(n)  (1994).
27.  See  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 230.  The  National  Bankruptcy  Review  Commis-DUKE LAW JOURNAL
However,  there  is  little controversy  surrounding  the principle
behind  Section 365-that  a  damage  claim  resulting from  rejection
is  to  be  treated  as  a  prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim  against  the
debtor. That principle, which has been  embodied in U.S. bankrupt-
cy  law  long  before  Section  365  was  enacted'  and  is  reflected  in
the  treatment  of executory  contracts  in  other  bankruptcy  systems
as  well, 29  is  broadly  supported  by  bankruptcy  scholars."  The
most commonly-given justification  for the RD rule is  that it imple-
ments  the  important  bankruptcy  principle  of  equality. 31  This  prin-
ciple  is  believed  to  require  that damage  claims  arising  from rejec-
tion  be  treated  no  differently  than  any  other  general  unsecured
claim  against the  debtor. 32
This  view ignores  the possibility that the law's  treatment  of a
rejection  claim may  influence  the trustee's  decision  of whether  to
reject  or  assume  the  contract  in the first instance. 3  That  decision,
in  turn,  may  determine  whether  the  resources  of the  bankruptcy
estate  and  the  other  party  to  the  contract  are  allocated  to  their
highest-value  use.  Thus, the law's  treatment  of  the rejection  claim
may  affect  not  only the nonbankrupt  party's  relative  share  of the
bankruptcy  estate,  but  also  the  total  value  available  to  the
nonbankrupt  party and the  debtor's other creditors.
As  the  Article  will  explain,  the  RD  rule  fails  to  align  the
trustee's  goal  of maximizing  the  payout  rate  for unsecured  claims
with  the  social  goal  of maximizing  total  value.  In  particular,  the
sion,  which  advises  Congress  on  amending  the  Bankruptcy  Code,  is  currently  preparing  a
number of proposals  for  revising  Section  365.
28.  In  the  United  States,  the  rule  originated  in  caselaw  and  was  first  codified  in
sections  63(c)  and 70(b)  of the  Bankruptcy Act  in  1938.  See  Michael  T. Andrew,  Execu-
tory  Contracts in  Bankruptcy:  Understanding "Rejection",  59  U.  COLO.  L.  REV.  845,
856-81  (1988)  (detailing  the  history  of the  rule's  development  from  19th-century  English
law);  see also Lee  Silverstein,  Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorga-
nization, 31  U. CHL  L. REV.  467,  467-72  (1964).
29.  See generally DENNIS  CAMPBELL,  INTERNATIONAL  CORPORATE  INSOLVENCY  LAW
(1992)  (analyzing  various  countries'  bankruptcy  laws);  EUROPEAN  CORPORATE  INSOLVEN-
CY  (Harry  Rajak  et  al.  eds.,  2d  ed.  1995)  (same).
30.  See,  e.g.,  DOUGLAS  G.  BAIRD,  THE  ELEMENTS  OF  BANKRUPTCY  119  (1993);
THOMAS  H.  JACKSON,  THE  LOGIC  AND  LIMITS  OF  BANKRUPTCY  LAW  108-09  (1986);
Andrew, supra note  28,  at  866-81;  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 252-53.
31.  See JACKSON,  supra note  30,  at 108-09.
32.  It  should  be  noted  that  while  treating  a  rejection  claim  as  any  other  unsecured
claim  against  the  estate  is  consistent  with  the  norm  of  equality,  giving  the  other  party
the  right  to  full performance  in  the  event  of assumption  is not. The  RD  rule  is  therefore
not  completely  consistent  with  the  norm  of equality.
33.  See  Triantis,  supra note  2,  at 690-96.
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rule  sometimes  provides  the bankruptcy  trustee  with  an incentive
to reject  executory  contracts when performance  would increase  the
total value  available  to  all  of  the  parties  affected.  This  distortion
arises  because the RD rule does not force  the estate to internalize
the  full  cost  of  rejection  to  the  nonbankrupt  party.  As  a  result,
the  trustee  sometimes  has  an  incentive  to  reject  when  rejection
makes  the  estate  better  off but  makes  the  other  party  worse off
by  a greater  amount-that is,  when rejection  reduces  total value.
After describing  the principle  of ratable  damages  embodied  in
Section  365  and the  distorted  incentive  created  by the  RD rule in
Part I, I consider  two  approaches  to  solving the resulting  problem
of  excessive  rejection.  Under the first  approach,  which  I  examine
in  Part  II,  the  bankruptcy  court  would  prevent  the  trustee  from
rejecting  a  contract  that  the  court  determines  is  value-creating.
This  approach  would build on the  existing  but rarely-applied  "bal-
ancing  test" doctrine,  which  allows  a  court  to  prevent  rejection  if
the  resulting  harm  to  the  nonbankrupt  party  far  outweighs  the
benefit  to  the  estate.  I  explain,  however,  that  incorporating  a
modified  "balancing  test" into  Section  365  may be  neither a desir-
able nor effective  approach to solving  the problem  of excessive re-
jection.
The  second  approach  to  solving  the  problem  of  excessive
rejection would give  the bankruptcy trustee  complete  discretion  to
assume  or  reject  the  executory  contract,  but  would  align  the
trustee's  objective  of  maximizing  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured
claims with the social goal of maximizing  total value. In Part 1II,  I
put  forward  and  analyze  three  rules  that  would  give  the  trustee
the  proper performance  incentives  by  adjusting  the  contract  price
in favor of the bankruptcy  estate by an amount  sufficient  to offset
any  distortion  in  favor  of  rejection.  After  explaining  how  each
price-adjustment  rule  would  eliminate  this  distortion,  I  attempt to
identify  drawbacks  and additional advantages  of each  rule, relative
to  the  RD  rule.  I  consider,  among  other  things,  the  amount  of
litigation that  may be  associated  with each  price-adjustment  rule,
the  effect  of the  rule  on  the  timing  of performance  decisions  in
bankruptcy,  and  the  effect  of  the  rule  on  performance  decisions
made  in  anticipation  of bankruptcy.  I  also  identify  and  compare
the  distributional  effects  of  the  alternative  rules  from  an  ex post
perspective.
Part  IV  of  the  Article  then  identifies  and  briefly  considers
two  ex ante effects  of making the treatment  of executory contractsDUKE LAW JOURNAL
in  bankruptcy  more  favorable  to  the  bankruptcy  estate:  1)  the
effect  on the incentive  of firms  to  file for bankruptcy;  and 2)  the
effect  on  the  ability  of  financially  distressed  firms  to  enter  into
contracts.  These effects  also must be considered in  determining  the
optimal  treatment  of executory  contracts  in bankruptcy.
The  purpose  of  this  Article  is  not  to  advocate  the  replace-
ment  of the  RD  rule.  As  we  will  see,  none  of  the  alternatives  I
consider  is  superior  to  the  RD  rule  in  all  respects.  Rather,  the
Article's  purposes  are:  1) to  describe  a problem  with  the RD rule
that  should  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  the  proper
treatment  of  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy;  2)  to  offer  for
consideration  various  arrangements  for  solving  the  problem  of
excessive  rejection;  and  3)  to  conduct  a  preliminary  investigation
into the potential  costs  and benefits of these arrangements.
I.  RATABLE  DAMAGES  UNDER  SEcTION  365
A.  Section 365 and the Ratable Damages Rule
The  treatment  of  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy  is  gov-
erned  by  11  U.S.C.  § 365.  In relevant  part,  § 365(a)  provides  that
"the  [bankruptcy]  trustee,  subject  to  the  court's  approval,  may
assume  or reject  any  executory  contract..,  of the debtor." 34  For
purposes  of this  Article, an  executory contract  is  a contract  under
which  at least  one  party  still  owes  performance  (other  than  pay-
ment)  at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
34.  The  last  clause  of § 365(a)  reads:  "may  assume  or  reject  any  executory  contract
or unexpired lease  of the  debtor."  11  U.S.C.  § 365(a)  (emphasis  added).  An  "unexpired
lease"  is  a  true  lease  (i.e.,  not  a  disguised  secured  loan)  that  has  not  terminated  before
the  date  of the  bankruptcy  filing.  See  In re  Pacific  Express,  Inc.,  780  F.2d  1482,  1487
(9th  Cir.  1986)  (holding  that  a  lease  that  is  a  disguised  secured  loan  will  not  be  subject
to  Section  365). This  Article  uses the  term  "executory  contract"  to include  an  "unexpired
lease."
35.  The  Bankruptcy  Code  does  not provide  a  definition  of the  term  "executory  con-
tract."  The  definition  of "executory  contract"  most  widely  used  for  purposes  of Section
365  is  that  set  out  almost  thirty  years  ago  by  Vern  Countryman,  a  leading  bankruptcy
scholar.  See  Vern  Countryman,  Executory  Contracts in  Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57  MINN.  L.
REV.  439,  260  (1973).  According  to  Professor  Countryman,  a  contract  should  be  consid-
ered  executory  (and  thus  subject  to  Section  365)  if  "the  obligation  of both  the  bankrupt
and  the  other  party  to  the  contract  are  so  far  unperformed  that  the  failure  of either  to
complete performance  would  constitute a  material breach  excusing  the  performance  of the
other."  ld. Some  courts  applying  Countryman's  definition  have  held  that  a  contract  under
which  only  one  side  owes  performance  is  not  "executory"  for  purposes  of  Section  365.
See,  e.g.,  In re Pacific  Express,  Inc.,  780  F.2d  1482,  1487  (9th  Cir. 1986).  The  usual  effect
of  imposing  such  a  bilateral  "executoriness"  requirement  is  to  deny  the  trustee  the  right
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If  the  trustee  "assumes"  the  contract,  Section  365  binds  the
bankruptcy  estate  to  the  contract,  permitting  the  estate  to  seek
performance  from  the  other  party  under  the  contract's  original
terms.36  Under  U.S.  bankruptcy  law,  obligations  in  connection
with  assumed  contracts-including  any  damage  claims  against  the
estate  for  post-assumption  breach-are  treated  as  postpetition
administration  claims,  which  are  paid  first  and  usually  in  full.37
Thus,  the effect  of assumption is that the estate  acquires  all of the
debtor's rights  and obligations  under the contract.
If the trustee "rejects"  the contract, the injured party may sue
for  damages  under  state  contract  law.3 "  The  rejection  "constitutes
a  [prepetition]  breach"  and  the  injured  party's  damage  claim  is
treated  pari passu  with  other  prebankruptcy  general  unsecured
claims  against  the  debtor. 3 9  The  damage  claim  is  thus  paid  its
ratable  share  of  the  value  available  for  distribution  to  general
unsecured  creditors.
In  most  cases,  the  effect  of  rejection  under  the  RD  rule  is
that  the  party  injured  by  rejection  is  paid  much  less  than  the
party's  full  damage  claim.4  The  RD  rule  thus  permits  the  estate
to benefit from the debtor's favorable  contracts  while reducing the
cost  of  ridding  itself  of  contracts  that  are  very  burdensome.  The
to  assume  a  contract  with  respect to  which  one  side  has  already  substantially  performed.
See  In re Continental  Properties,  Inc.,  15  B.R.  732  (Bankr.  D.  Hawaii  1981).  In  the  dis-
cussion  paper  version  of this  Article,  I  explain  why  this  bilateral  "executoriness"  require-
ment  reduces  the  efficiency  performance  of  Section  365.  In  particular,  I  show  that  the
requirement  of bilateral  "executoriness"  can  prevent  value-increasing  contracts  from  being
assumed  (and  is  not  necessary  to  prevent  value-reducing  contracts  from  being  assumed
and  performed).  See  Jesse  M.  Fried,  Executory  Contracts and Performance Decisions in
Bankruptcy 36-37,  Discussion  Paper  No.  201,  John  M.  Olin  Center  for  Law,  Economics,
and  Business  at Harvard  Law  School  (Oct.  1996)  (on  file  with  the  Duke Law Journal).
36.  In  certain  cases,  an assumed  contract  can  be  assigned  to  a  third  party.  See infra
note  41.  If there  has  been a  default  in  the  contract,  the trustee  may not  assume  the  con-
tract  unless  she  provides  adequate  assurance  that  the  estate  will  promptly  cure  the  de-
fault,  compensate  the  other party  for  any  pecuniary  loss  resulting  from  the  default,  and
perform  its future  obligations  under the  contract.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 365(b)(1).  Certain  types
of  contracts,  including  financial  accommodation  contracts,  may  not  be  assumed  by  the
trustee.  See id. § 365(c).
37.  See id. §§  507(a)(1),  503(b);  Westbrook,  supra note  8, at 232.
38.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 502(g).  Certain  provisions  may  limit  the  amount  of damages  the
nonbankrupt  party  can  claim.  See  i.  § 502(b)(6)  (capping  damages  for  claims  by  real
property  lessors);  § 502(b)(7)  (capping  damages  for  employees  under  an employment  con-
tract).
39.  See  id.  §§  365(g)(1),  502(g).  I  am  assuming  throughout  that  the  injured  party  is
unsecured.  See supra note  13.
40.  See supra note  14  and  accompanying  text.526  DUKE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol.  46:517
trustee  is  generally  given  discretion  to  decide  which  course  of
action-assumption  or rejection-best  serves  the estate.41
To  illustrate  the  effect  of  the  RD  rule,  suppose  that  Firm
agrees  to  pay  Builder  $100  for  construction  of a factory  that  will
cost Builder  $60  to  build.  Suppose  further  that before  the factory
is  constructed  and  any  payment is  made,  Firm  enters  bankruptcy.
Finally  assume  that  the  expected  payout  rate  for  general  unse-
cured  claims  at the end of the bankruptcy  proceeding  is  30%.
Under  ordinary  principles  of contract  law,  a  party  to  a  con-
tract must either perform  or pay damages that are  sufficient to put
the  other  party  in  the same  position  as performance  would  have.
Thus,  outside  of  bankruptcy,  Firm  would  have  a  choice  between
1) paying  $100 for  the factory  and 2) breaching  and paying Build-
41.  In  certain  cases,  the trustee  may  have  a  third  choice:  assumption  of the  executo-
ry  contract,  followed  by  assignment  of  the  contract  to  a  third  party.  See  11  U.S.C.
§ 365(0.  If  the  contract  is  assigned,  the  bankruptcy  estate  is  released  from  any  liability
arising  from  the  assignment  (even  if  the  contract's  own  terms  bar  such  an  assignment).
See id.  §§  365(0,  (k).  This treatment  is  unlike  that under  state  law,  where  an anti-assign-
ment  provision  either  renders  the  assignment  ineffective  or  makes  the  assigning  party
liable  for  any  damages  arising  from  the  assignment.  See  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF
CONTRACrs  §§  317(2),  322(2)  (1981);  U.C.C.  § 2-210(1)-(3)  (1995).  The  incentives  created
by  the  no-damages  ("ND")  assignment  rule  are  analyzed  elsewhere.  See Jesse  M.  Fried,
Assignment  Under Contract and Bankruptcy Law  (unpublished  manuscript)  (on  file  with
author).  There  I  show  that  the  ND  assignment  rule  somewhat  mitigates  the  problem  of
value-wasting  rejection  identified  in  this  Article,  but  gives  rise  to  the  problem  of  exces-
sive  assignment.  However,  since  the  ND  assignment  rule  under  § 365  does  not  alter  the
main  results  of this  Article,  I  abstract  here  from  the possibility  of assignment  in  order to
focus  on  the  choice  between  rejection  and  performance.
Until  the  disposition  of an  executory  contract  is  determined,  the  contract  is  general-
ly  not enforceable  against  the  estate.  See NLRB  v.  Bildisco  & Bildisco,  465  U.S.  513, 532
(1984).  However,  a trustee  may  elect  to  obtain  the  benefits  of the  contract  by  paying  the
other party  fair value,  which  is  generally  the  contract  price.  See In  re Tirenational  Corp.,
47  B.R.  647,  650  (Bankr.  N.D.  Ohio  1985).  An  estate  that  is  under  a  nonresidential  real
property  lease  or certain  personal property  leases must  perform  all  of the  debtor's  obliga-
tions  under  the  lease.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 365(d)(3),  (10).  For  discussions  of  the  status  of
executory  contracts  during  this  "limbo"  period,  see  Douglas  W.  Bordewieck,  The
Postpetition,  Pre-Rejection,  Pre-Assumption  Status  of  an  Executory  Contract, 59  AM.
BANKR.  L.J.  197  (1985);  Howard  C.  Buschman,  III.,  Benefits and Burdens: Post-Petition
Performance of Unassumed Contracts, 5 BANKR.  DEV.  J. 341  (1988);  Neil  P.  Olack,  Exec-
utory  Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Right to  Adequate Protection Prior to Assumption
or Rejection, 4  BANKR.  DEv.  J. 421  (1987).
In  a Chapter  7  liquidation  proceeding,  executory  contracts  that  the  trustee  does not
seek to  assume  (and  then  either  perform  or  assign)  or reject  are  deemed  rejected  after a
certain  period  of time elapses.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 365(d)(1),  (4).  In  a  successful  Chapter  11
reorganization,  such  contracts  may  "ride  through"  bankruptcy  unaffected  and  continue  to
bind the  debtor. See  eg., In re Parkwood  Realty  Corp.,  157 B.R.  687,  690  (Bankr.  W.D.
Wash.  1993).DUKE LAW JOURNAL
sel;49  and  void  a  partnership  dissolution  agreement  barring  the
debtor  accountant  from providing  services  to former  clients  of the
partnership. °
Congress  and  the  courts  typically  justify  the  RD  rule  on  the
grounds  that  it  assists  the  rehabilitation  of  the  debtor"  and
serves  bankruptcy's  goal  of  increasing  the  value  of the  estate  on
behalf  of  all unsecured  creditors.  Bankruptcy  scholars  support  the
ratable  damages  rule  on  different  grounds:  namely,  that  treating
the rejection  claim of the injured party the same  as  those of other
general  unsecured  creditors  ensures  that  the  fundamental  bank-
ruptcy  principle  of equality  is  not violated. 2  Consider  the  view  of
one  prominent  bankruptcy  scholar  who  has  written  extensively  on
bankruptcy  from  an economic  perspective:
[The  other party to the executory  contract]  is just like  the [bank-
rupt  Firm's]  other  unsecured  creditors:  a  party  with  a  nominal
claim that, because  [Firm]  is insolvent,  will not have  its expectan-
cies met in full.  There is no reason  [the other  party]  should  have
its  claim  paid  in  full  (by  requiring  adherence  to  the  contract)
when  all  other  unsecured  creditors  are  getting  only  a  few  cents
on  the  dollar.  Rejection,  then,  provides  a  way  of  equalizing
things  among  creditors  when  the  liability  represented  by  the
contract  exceeds  the  value  of  the  asset  represented  by  a  con-
tract. 53
This  analysis  misses  an important point:  The  treatment  of the
rejection  claim may  affect whether  the trustee  decides  to  reject  or
perform  in  the first instance.  That  decision  determines  the  use  to
which  the  assets  of  the  estate  and  the  other party  are  put.  How
these  assets  are  deployed  can  in  turn  affect  the  total  amount  of
value  available to  the estate  and  the  other party.  Thus,  the  treat-
ment  of  the  rejection  claim  affects  not  only  the  injured  party's
relative  share  of the bankruptcy  estate  but  also  the  total  amount
49.  See  Cohen  v.  Drexel  Burnham  Lambert  Group,  Inc.  (In  re  Drexel  Burnham
Lambert  Group,  Inc.),  138 B.R.  687,  694  (Bankr.  S.D.N.Y.  1992).
50.  See In  re  Silver, 26  B.R. 526,  528  (Bank. E.D.  Pa.  1983).
51.  See In re Booth,  19  B.R.  53,  60  (Bankr.  D.  Utah  1982)  (noting  that  "[e]xecutory
contracts  should  be  handled  to  'assist  in  the  debtor's  rehabilitation"'  (citing  H.R.  REP.
No.  95-595,  at  348  (1978),  reprinted in 1978  U.S.C.C.A.N.  5787,  6304)).
52.  See,  e.g.,  BAIRD,  supra note  30,  at  117;  JACKSON,  supra note  30,  at  109;  Eliza-
beth  Warren,  Bankruptcy Policy, 54  U.  CHi.  L.  REV.  775,  791  (1987);  Westbrook,  supra
note  8,  at  252-53.
53.  JACKSON,  supra note  30,  at 108-09.
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of value  available  to  all of the parties affected  by  the rule. 54 And,
as  the following  Section  will  explain,  the RD rule sometimes  gives
the  bankruptcy  trustee  an incentive  to make  decisions  that reduce
the  total  value  available  to  the  estate  and  the  other party  to the
executory  contract.
B.  Distorted Performance Incentives Under the Ratable Damages
Rule
This  Section  will  explain  why  the RD  rule underlying  Section
365  sometimes  gives  the  bankruptcy  trustee  an incentive  to  reject
contracts  that  are value-creating." 5  For purposes  of the  analysis,  a
contract  is  considered  to be value-creating  if and  only if, as of the
time  the  performance  decision  is  made,  performance  would  in-
crease  the  total  amount  of  value  that  would  be  available  to  the
estate  and  the  other  party  to  the  contract. 56  Total  value  would
increase  if  the  party  receiving  performance  would  value  it  more
than  it would cost  the  other party to  perform:  the  amount  of the
increase  would  be  the  difference  between  the  cost  and  the  value
of performance. 7
Before  proceeding  with  the  analysis,  it will  be  useful  to  con-
sider parties'  breach/performance  incentives  outside of bankruptcy.
Outside  of  bankruptcy,  the  "expectation  damages"  ("ED")  rule
requires that a party  breaching  a contract pay damages  to "put the
[injured  party]  in  as  good  a  position  as  he  would  have  been  had
the  [breaching  party]  kept  his  contract., 5 8  In  other  words,  the
breaching party must pay damages  in an  amount that compensates
54.  As  we  will  see  later  in  the  Article,  the  treatment  of  executory  contracts  in
bankruptcy  will  also  have  efficiency  consequences  even  before  the  debtor  enters  bank-
ruptcy.
55.  The  analysis  in  Parts  I-I1  focuses  mostly  on  the  incentives  that  various  rules
give  the trustee  to  perform  or  reject  executory  contracts  once  a  firm  has  filed for  bank-
ruptcy.  As  we will  see  later in  the  Article,  however,  the  treatment  of executory  contracts
in bankruptcy  will  also  affect  other aspects  of the  parties'  behavior  in bankruptcy,  as  well
as  decisions  made  in anticipation  of bankruptcy.
56.  To  focus  the  analysis,  I  assume  throughout  that  performance  does  not  generate
any  negative  or  positive  externalities  on  third  parties-that  is,  the  bankruptcy  estate  and
the nonbankrupt  party  to the  contract  are  the  only  parties  affected  by  performance.
57.  The  price  of the  contract  is  irrelevant  to  the  determination  of  whether  perfor-
mance  would  be  value-increasing:  the  price  is  merely  a  zero-sum  transfer  of money  be-
tween  the  parties  that  would  have  no  effect  on the  total value  to  be  shared.
58.  Richard  Craswell,  Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the  Theory  of Efficient
Breach, 61  S.  CAL  L.  REV.  629,  636  (1988)  (quoting  Hawkins  v.  McGee,  146  A.  641,
643  (N.H. 1929)).
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the  injured  party  fully  for  the  loss  of  profit  or  gain  the  injured
party  expected  from  performance-no  more  and  no  less.  As  a
result, a  party will  not have  an  incentive  to  breach  when  its  gain
from  breach  (the  loss  from  performance  it  avoids  by  breach)
would  be less  than  the loss  imposed  on  the other  party  (the gain
from  performance  that  is  not realized  by  the  other  party  because
of the breach)-that  is,  when breach  would be value-wasting. 9  At
the  same  time,  a party  will have  an  incentive  to  breach  when  its
gain  from  breach  would be  greater  than  the loss  imposed  on the
other  party-that  is,  when  breach  would  be  value-increasing.
6 0
Thus,  as  is  already  a  familiar point in  the  literature,  the ED  rule
generally  discourages  value-wasting  breach  and  facilitates  breach
when  performance  is  value-wasting.6'  As  a  result,  the  ED  rule
tends to give the parties  to a contract the incentive  to make value-
increasing  breach/performance  decisions. 62
59.  For  example,  suppose  that  Firm  has  agreed  to  pay  $100  to  Builder  for  construc-
tion  of a factory  that would  cost Builder  $60  to build.  Builder  therefore  expects  the  con-
tract  to  generate  a  profit  of $40  ($100  - $60).  Suppose  further  that,  when  the  factory  is
to  be  constructed,  Firm  would  value  the  factory  at  only  $80.  Since  the  contract  price  is
$100,  Firm  would  prefer,  everything  else  equal,  not  to  pay  for  the  factory.  However,
since  breach  would  cost Firm  $40  in  expectation  damages  (the  profit  expected  by  Build-
er),  and  performance  would  reduce  Firm's wealth  by  only  $20  ($100  - $80),  the  ED  rule
gives  Firm  an  incentive  to  perform-the  desirable  course  of action  because  performance
would  increase  the  value  available  to  both  parties  by  $20  (the  value  of  the  factory  to
Firm  less  the  cost  of construction  to  Builder:. $80  - $60).
60.  For  example,  suppose  that  Firm  has  agreed  to  pay  $100  to  Builder  for  construc-
tion  of a  factory  that  would  cost  Builder $60  to  build.  Builder  therefore  expects the  con-
tract to  generate  a  profit  of  $40  ($100  - $60).  Suppose  further that,  when  the  factory  is
to  be  constructed,  Firm  would  value  the  factory  at  only  $40.  Since  breach  would  cost
Firm  $40  in  expectation  damages  (the  profit  expected  by  Builder),  and  performance
would  reduce  Firm's wealth  by  $60  ($100  - $40),  the  ED  rule gives  Firm  an  incentive  to
breach-the  desirable  course  of action  because  performance  would  reduce  the  value  avail-
able to both  parties  by  $20  (the  cost of building  the  factory  less  its  value  to  Firm:  $60  -
$40).
61.  See,  eg.,  RIcHARD  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  LAW  (4th  ed.  1991),
117-26;  John  H.  Barton,  The  Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1  J.
LEGAL  STUD.  277,  283-89  (1972);  Robert  L.  Birmingham,  Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and  Economic Efficiency,  24  RuTGErPS  L.  REv.  273,  284-86  (1970);  Steven
Shavell,  Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11  BELL  I.  ECON.  466  (1980).  For  an
argument  that  the  expectation  damages  rule  does  not  fully compensate  the  injured  party
and  thus  may  permit  value-wasting  breach,  see  Daniel  Friedmann,  The  Efficient Breach
Fallacy, 18 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  1, 6-7  (1989).
62.  In  any  given  case,  the  ability  of  the  ED  rule  to  provide  desirable  incentives
depends  on  the  parties  estimating  properly  the  damages  from  breach  and  the  cost  of
performance,  and  the  ability  of injured  parties  to  recover  any  litigation  expenses  incurred
in  recovering  damages.  See  Daniel  A.  Farber,  Reassessing  the  Economic  Efficiency  of
Compensatory Damages for Breach of  Contract, 66  VA.  L.  REV.  1443,  1444-45  (1980).1996]  EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN  BANKRUPTCY  531
We  are  now  ready  to  examine  the  performance  incentives
created by the RD  rule.  As we saw,  the RD  rule  gives  the bank-
ruptcy  trustee  a  choice  between  performing  an executory  contract
according  to  its  original terms  and rejecting  the contract  and  pay-
ing  less  than 100%  of any  resulting  damage  claim.  The  ability to
pay less than full  damages  means that the estate is not required  to
internalize  the  loss  that  rejection  imposes  on  the  nonbankrupt
party. 3  Consequently,  the trustee  may  have  an incentive  to  reject
even if the  estate's  gain from rejectiont e  is  much  smaller  than  the
other  party's  loss.  Indeed,  the  trustee  has  an  incentive  to  reject
any value-creating  contract that makes the estate worse  off as long
as  the  estate's  benefit  from  rejection  is  greater  than  the  amount
the injured party receives  as  an unsecured  creditor.
Example.  To  examine  the  perform/reject  incentives  created  by
the  RD  rule,  again  suppose  that  Firm  agrees  to  pay  $100  for
construction  of a factory  that  would  cost Builder  $60.  However,
before the factory  is built or payment is made, Firm  enters bank-
ruptcy.6  Assume  that  the  payout  rate  to  unsecured  creditors  is
expected  to  be  thirty  cents  on  the  dollar.  Thus,  under  the  RD
rule  Firm's  estate  may  either  pay  $100  for  construction  of the
factory,  or  reject  and  pay  Builder  30%  of  its  $40  damage
Unless  specified  otherwise,  the  numerical  examples  assume  for simplicity  that  each  party
knows  the  value  and  cost  of performance  and  that  litigation  expenses  are  negligible  rela-
tive to  the  amounts  at  stake  (and  thus can  be  ignored).
63.  To  be  precise,  the  value  of the  estate  itself (that  is,  the  value  of  the  assets  of
the  estate)  is  not  affected  by  rejection.  Rejection  only  increases  the  amount  of  claims
against  those  assets.  However,  the  effect  of rejection  on  the  payout rate for  unsecured
claims  (and  therefore  the  effect  of  rejection  on  the  amount  received  by  the  debtor's
other  unsecured  creditors)  is  the  same  as if the  estate  were  reduced  by  an amount  equal
to  the  ratable  damages  the  party  injured  by  rejection  ultimately  receives  as  an unsecured
creditor.
64.  The  estate's  gain  from  rejection  equals  the  reduction  in  the  value  of  the  estate
that  would  have  resulted from  performance.
65.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  I  assume  that  Firm  is  the  party  in  bankruptcy  (rather
than  Builder).  The  analysis  would  apply  equally  if  Builder  were  the  party  in  bankruptcy
(although  the  terms  would  change  to  reflect  the  reversal  of the  parties'  positions-e.g.,
rejection  damages  would  be calculated  as  the  difference  between  Firm's  valuation  of the
factory  and  the  contract  price,  rather  than  as  the  difference  between  the  contract  price
and  Builder's  cost  of performance).  I  also  assume  that  the  debts  of  the  party  in  bank-
ruptcy  exceed  its  assets  and  that  the  assets  of  the  party  outside  bankruptcy  exceed  its
debts. Although  a  debtor  need not  be  balance-sheet  insolvent to  enter  bankruptcy,  appli-
cation  of the  RD  rule  when  the  party  in  bankruptcy  has  a positive  net worth  is no  dif-
ferent  than  the  application  of the  ED  rule  when  the  party  has a  positive  net  worth  and
is  outside  bankruptcy:  every  claim  against  such  a  debtor  in  bankruptcy  would  also,  in
principle,  be  paid  in full.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
claim-$12.  Suppose  that Firm's  estate  would  value  performance
at  $80.  Thus  performance  would  make  the  estate  worse  off  by
$20  ($100  - $80).  Since  rejection  would  cost  the estate  only  $12,
the  estate has  an incentive  to reject  the  contract, which  would  be
an  undesirable  result  since  performance  would  create  $20  of
value (the value  of $80 Firm places  on performance less Builder's
cost  of $60).  Indeed,  Firm's  bankruptcy trustee  does not have  an
incentive  to  perform  as  long  as  the  estate  would  value  perfor-
mance  at  less  than $88-that is,  even  if performance  would  cre-
ate as much  as  $28 ($88  - $60)  of value.6
As  the  preceding  example  illustrates,  under  the  RD  rule  a
bankruptcy  estate may find it worthwhile to reject even  though the
cost  of rejection  to  the  other party  is greater  than  the  benefit  to
the  estate  of  not  performing  the  contract.  The  severity  of  the
distortion  in  favor  of  rejection  depends  on  the  expected  payout
rate for unsecured  claims-the lower the expected  payout rate, the
greater  the  distortion  in  favor  of  rejection.  As  the  payout  rate
decreases,  so  does  the  cost  of  rejection,  and  the  more  attractive
rejection  becomes.
Although  some  studies  suggest that  the payout rate for  unse-
cured  creditors  in  Chapter  11  bankruptcy  is,  on  average,  about
30%,67  in  Chapter  7  liquidations-which  comprise  the majority  of
bankruptcy  cases-the  payout  rate  is much  less.  In  fact, the  aver-
age  payout rate  to  general  unsecured  creditors  in  Chapter  7 liqui-
dation  proceedings  is  less than  5% .6 In  such  cases,  trustees  have
a very  strong incentive  to reject unfavorable  contracts,  even if per-
formance  would be substantially value-increasing.
6 9
Example.  To  illustrate  the  effect  of  a  lower  payout  rate  on  the
trustee's  incentive  to  perform,  suppose  again  that  Builder  has
agreed  to build  Firm  a  factory  for  $100  that  would  cost  Builder
$60  (generating  a  benefit  of $40  for Builder).  However,  now  the
66.  The  cost  of rejection  would  be  $12;  thus  the  estate  has  an  incentive  to  perform
as  long  as  performance  either 1) would  reduce  the  value  of  the  estate  by  less  than  $12
or  2)  would  increase  the  value  of  the  estate  (the  estate  would  value  performance  at
more  than  the  contract  price  of  $100).  Since  the  contract  price  is  $100,  performance
,would  make the  estate  worse  off by  $12  when  the  estate  would  value  the  factory  at  $88.
Thus if the  estate  would  value the  factory  at more  than  $88,  the  trustee  has an  incentive
to  seek  performance  of the  contract.
67.  See supra note  14.
68.  See  id.
69.  To  be  sure,  the  typical  contract  in  a  Chapter  7  case  is  not  as  likely  to  be  sub-
stantially value-increasing  as  one  in  a  Chapter  11  proceeding.
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payout rate for unsecured  claims  is 5% rather than  30%.  The  ex-
pected  cost  of rejection  to  Firm's  estate  now  would  be  only  $2
(5% of $40)  rather than  $12  (30%  of $40). Therefore,  the trustee
does  not have  an  incentive  to  perform  even  if the  estate  would
value  performance  as  high  as  $98-that is,  even  if performance
would  create  as much as  $38 of value. By  contrast, we saw in the
previous example  that at a payout rate of 30%  the trustee has an
incentive  to  perform  if  the  estate  would  value  performance  at
more than  $8820
As the previous  example indicates,  the number  of value-creat-
ing  contracts  rejected-and  the  average  value  lost  when  those
contracts  are rejected-would  tend  to  increase  as  the payout  rate
for general unsecured claims  declines. 71
C.  A  Note on the Significance of the Problem
Although  the  RD  rule  distorts  the  trustee's  performance  in-
centives  in favor  of rejection, the  RD rule  only provides  an incen-
tive  for  the  trustee  to  reject  certain  value-creating  contracts  that
would make the estate worse  off; the RD rule does not necessarily
cause the  trustee  to  reject  these  contracts.  This  Section  considers
three factors  that might, to  a greater  or lesser  degree, mitigate the
problem  of excessive  rejection  under the RD rule.
1.  The  Possibility of Renegotiation. As  is  by  now  a  standard
and  familiar  point  in  the  contracts  literature,  both  parties  to  a
value-creating  contract  that might  otherwise  be  breached  have  an
incentive  to  renegotiate  and  perform  the  contract  because  the
surplus  created  by  performance  can  be  shared  in  such  a  way  to
make  both parties  better  off than  under breach."  Of course,  it is
recognized  that  whether  renegotiation  occurs  (and  if  it  occurs,
whether  it is  successful)  will  depend  on  the  "transaction  costs"-
including  those  arising  from  the  parties'  incentive  to  engage  in
strategic  behavior-associated  with  renegotiation.'  In  the  non-
70.  See  supra note 66  and  accompanying  text.
71.  The  distortion  in  favor  (and  the  social  cost)  of  value-wasting  rejection  is  also
greater  when  courts  interpret  Section  365  to  permit  the  estate  to  cancel  an  executory
contract  (such  as  a license  agreement),  not  merely  breach  the  debtor's  affirmative  obliga-
tions  under the  contract.  See supra note 25  and  accompanying  text.  An  economic  analysis
of  the  effect  of interpreting  Section  365  to  permit  cancellation  can  be found  in  the  dis-
cussion  paper  version  of this  Article.  See  Fried, supra note  35,  at 31-35.
72.  See  Craswell,  supra note  58,  at  638-40.
73.  Id.  at 638-39;  Charles  I.  Goetz  & Robert  E. Scott,  The  Mitigation Principle: To-DUKE LAW JOURNAL
bankruptcy  context,  it  is  believed  that  transaction  costs  and
strategic  behavior  by  the  parties  can  sometimes  make  successful
renegotiation  very  difficult. 74 The  fact  that thousands  of firms  are
unable  to  avoid  a  costly  bankruptcy  proceeding  by  renegotiating
with  their  creditors  outside  of  bankruptcy  indicates  that  impedi-
ments  to renegotiation  can  be substantial.
In  bankruptcy,  there  at  least  three  factors  that  may  make
renegotiation  even  more  difficult:'1)  the possibility  of severe  time
constraints;  2)  the  limited  authority  of  the  trustee  (combined  with
frequent  managerial  turnover);  and  3)  potential  uncertainty  over
which  party  will  take  control  of the  emerging  business.  Each  of
these factors  will  be explored in turn.
First,  the  need  to  conserve  cash  or  stem  losses  may  require
the trustee  to  decide  the  disposition  of dozens  (or even  hundreds)
of executory  contracts  within a short period  of time after the  debt-
or files  for bankruptcy.  Time  constraints  might make  it impossible
for the  trustee  to  enter  into negotiations  with  many  of these  par-
ties.  And  if  the  values  of  some  of  the  contracts  are  interdepen-
dent,  the  failure  to  successfully  renegotiate  one  contract  may  re-
quire  the  trustee  to reject  many others  as  well. For  example,  sup-
pose  that  Firm  has,  after  contracting  with  Builder  to  construct  a
factory, entered  into contracts  with other parties  for machines, raw
materials,  and  other  inputs.  Concessions  may  be  needed  from  all
of  these  parties  in  order  to  make  construction  and  operation  of
the factory  profitable  for Firm's  estate.  If any  one  of  these  other
parties  refuses  to  renegotiate  the price  with  the  trustee  of Firm's
estate, the trustee may be required  to reject  all of the contracts.
Second,  during  the  bankruptcy  proceeding  there  is  no  single
party that has complete, continuous  control of the estate. Although
the trustee is generally free to make routine  business  decisions, the
trustee's  more important  decisions may be challenged  by any party
that  believes  that  it  will  be  adversely  affected.  As  a  result,  the
trustee  cannot  negotiate  with  as  much  authority  as  a  firm's  man-
agement can  outside of bankruptcy, which may make renegotiation
more  difficult.  Renegotiation  may  also .be  disrupted  by  the  high
rate  of management  turnover  in bankruptcy.7 5
wards a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA.  L.  REV.  967,  982-83  (1983).
74.  Goetz  &  Scott, supra note  73,  at  982-83.
75.  See  Stuart  C.  Gilson,  Bankruptcy,  Boards, Banks,  and  Blockholders,  27  J.  FIN.
ECON.  355,  370  (1990)  (reporting  that  over  half  of  the  CEOs  of  the  110  NYSE  and
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Third,  executory  contracts  are  often  rejected  as  part  of the
plan  that  is  approved  at  the  end  of  a  Chapter  11  proceeding.
When there  is only  one plan  on the table,  a party  seeking  perfor-
mance  of  an  executory  contract  with  the  debtor  may  have  an
incentive  to  negotiate  with  the  party  behind  the  proposed  plan.
However,  there  are  often  multiple,  competing  plans.  When  it  is
not  clear  whose  plan  will  ultimately  prevail,  a party  seeking  per-
formance  of  an  executory  contract  with  the  debtor  will  have  less
of  an  incentive  to  negotiate  with  any  of  the  parties  proposing
plans.7 6
To  be  sure,  rejection  of  a  contract  in  bankruptcy  does  not
necessarily  mean  that  a  similar  contract  will  not  be  performed
after  the  debtor  emerges  from bankruptcy.  After  bankruptcy,  the
factors  that  make  renegotiation  in  bankruptcy  especially  difficult
would no  longer be  present. There  would  thus be fewer  obstacles
to  reaching  agreement.  If performance  still  would  be  value-creat-
ing, the parties  may well  contract for it again.
However,  there  are  likely  to  be  many  cases  in  which  a  con-
tract  that  would  be  value-creating  at  the  time  the  debtor  is  in
bankruptcy  is  no  longer  value-creating  one,  two,  or  three  years
later  when  the  debtor  emerges  from  Chapter  11.  Business  condi-
tions may have changed.  The  debtor may have abandoned  the line
of business  to which the contract  related. The other party may no
longer  be  able  to  enter  the  contract  because  it has  since  entered
into  a  mutually  exclusive  contract.  In  these  cases,  rejection  of  a
value-creating  contract  in bankruptcy  may well mean  a permanent
loss  of value.
AMEX  firms  that  were  restructured  or  filed  for  Chapter  11  bankruptcy  left  their  jobs
within  two  years  of the  event).
76.  Divergent  expectations  over  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims  could  also
affect  the  likelihood  and  success  of  renegotiation,  but  they  would  not  necessarily  make
renegotiation  more  difficult.  If  the  nonbankrupt  party's  estimate  of  the  payout  rate  for
unsecured  claims  is  higher  than  that  of the  trustee,  its  willingness  to  adjust  the  price  in
favor  of the  estate  will  be  less than  it  would  be outside  of bankruptcy.  If,  on the  other
hand, the  nonbankrupt  party's  estimate  of the  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims  is  lower
than that  of the  trustee,  it  will be  more  willing to  compromise  than  outside  of bankrupt-
cy. However,  uncertainty  over the  payout  rate  could  cause  the  trustee  to delay  renegotia-
tion  (or  delay  making  a  unilateral  decision  to  perform  or  reject)  until  it  is  able  to form
a more  accurate  estimate  of the  expected  payout  rate.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
2.  Reputational Considerations.  It might  be  argued  that even
when  renegotiation  is  not  possible,  there  could  be  reputational
reasons  for  the  bankruptcy  trustee  to  perform  an  unfavorable
contract  that makes  the  other  party much  better  off.
77  Opportun-
istic rejection  of a contract in  bankruptcy, the argument  might  go,
could  harm  the  debtor's  reputation  and  make  it  more  costly  for
the  debtor  to  transact  business  both  during  and  after  the  bank-
ruptcy proceeding.  Thus, reputational  concerns might  deter a bank-
rupt firm  from  rejecting  an  executory  contract  when  performance
would  be significantly  value-increasing. 78
However,  there  are  three  reasons  why  reputational  concerns
may  not  deter  a  bankruptcy  trustee  from  rejecting  value-creating
contracts  under the RD rule. First, for the bankrupt  firm's reputa-
tion  to  be  damaged  by  rejection,  other  parties  must  be  able  to
observe  that  performance  would  be  value-increasing. 7 9  But  in
practice  it  may  be  very  difficult  for  those  outside  the  bankrupt
firm  to  determine  whether  a  particular  contract  would  be  value-
creating  or value-wasting.  This  distinction  turns  on  the  value  the
firm would attach to performance,  which only those controlling  the
firm  may  know.  Second,  even  if  it  could  easily  be  determined
whether  a  particular  rejection  is  value-creating  or  value-wasting,
the  firm's  reputation  may  have  been  so  badly  damaged  by  the
problems  that forced  it into bankruptcy  in  the first place  that  the
marginal  cost  to its  reputation  of rejecting  a particular  value-creat-
ing  contract  would be insignificant. 0
Finally, except for large publicly-traded  companies,  most firms
entering  bankruptcy  end  up  being  liquidated  or sold  to  new  own-
ers.81 Over  70%  of  firms  entering  bankruptcy  file  under  the  liqui-
77.  For an  analysis  of the  effect  of reputation  on  the  incentive  to  breach  outside  of
bankruptcy,  see  Lewis  A.  Kornhauser,  Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of  Contract, 26
J.L.  & ECON.  691  (1983).
78.  See  Lemma  W. Senbet,  Comment,  Protecting Stakeholder Interests in  Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 43  U. TORONTO  L.J. 717,  718  (1993).
79.  I  assume  a  party  in  a  long-term  relationship  would  not  incur  reputational  costs
from  rejecting  a  contract  the  other party  knows  is  value-wasting  since  rejection  would  in-
crease  the  amount  of total  value  available  to  both parties.
80.  See  Douglas  G.  Baird,  The  Initiation Problem in  Bankruptcy, 11  INT. REv.  L. &
ECON.  223,  227-31  (1991).
81.  See  1995  BANKRuiyrcy  YEARBOOK  AND  ALMANAC  8  (Christopher  M.  McHugh,
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dation  provisions  of  Chapter  7,'  meaning  that  they  are  either
liquidated  or  acquired  by  new  owners.  These  firms-many  of
which operate  as going  businesses  for  at least part  of  a Chapter  7
proceeding-face  no  reputational  constraints.'  Of  the  remaining
30%  that enter  bankruptcy  through  Chapter  11-that is,  the firms
most  likely  to  care  about their  reputations-a  majority  are  either
liquidated  or  sold  to  new  owners  before  a  plan  is  confirmed. 4
Consequently,  most firms  are  likely to  discount  heavily  the future
reputational  benefit  of  performing  an  unfavorable  contract-par-
ticularly  since  performance  of  such  a  contract  may  reduce  the
likelihood that the firm will  survive long  enough to reap any  bene-
fit from this  investment."
3.  Opting Out of the RD Rule with  Security Interests. I  have
argued  that  ex post renegotiation  and  reputational  considerations
may  not  substantially  reduce  the  problem  of  excessive  rejection
under  the  RD  rule.  However,  two  parties  to  a  contract  could,  in
principle,  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  RD  rule  by  taking
security  interests  in each other's  assets.
The  RD  rule  applies  only  when  the  rejection  claim  is  unse-
cured.  If  the  nonbankrupt  party  obtains  a  nonvoidable  security
interest in the debtor's assets  before  the debtor files for bankrupt-
cy,  the  security  interest  would  give  any  rejection  claim  priority  in
82.  See  id.
83.  See  Nimmer, supra note  6,  at 523.
84.  See  Lynn  M.  LoPucki,  The  Debtor in  Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chap-
ter  11  of the  Bankruptcy  Code,  57  AM.  BANKR.  L.J.  99,  106-07  (1983);  see  also In  re
Petur  U.S.A. Instrument  Co.,  35  B.R.  561,  564  (Bankr.  W.D.  Wash.  1983)  (taking judicial
notice that  since  the  effective  date of the  1978  Bankruptcy  Code  only  3.5%  of the  Chap-
ter  11  cases  in  the  court's  district  had  resulted  in  confirmed  plans,  and  that  most of the
confirmed  cases  involved  partial  or total  liquidation  of the  debtor  business).
85.  Even  if the bankrupt  firm's management  were  inclined  to  perform  an  unfavorable
contract  in  order  to  preserve  the  business'  reputation,  unsecured  creditors  might  oppose
any  step  to  reduce  the tangible  value  of the  estate  (thereby  increasing  the  likelihood  that
the  unsecured  creditors  will not  be  paid)  in  order  to  obtain  an intangible  future  benefit.
See ELIZABETH  WARREN  &  JAY  LAWRENCE  WESTBROOK,  THE  LAW  OF  DEBTORS  AND
CREDITORS  468-69  (1991).
In  some  circumstances  creditors  complain  because  the  DIP  is  making  business
choices  that  are  hostile  to  the  creditors'  interests.  Creditors  may  be  interested
in  asset  protection  or  liquidation,  while  the  DIP  may  wish  to  gamble  assets  in
the  hope  of  a  long-range  comeback  ....  If  the  disputes  between  [the  DIP]
and  creditors  become  really  serious,  the  creditors  may  seek  appointment  of  a
trustee  to  run  the  business.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the underlying  collateral  over  all  other  claims.  Since  any  rejection
claim  would  therefore  be  paid  in  full  (or up  to  the  value  of  the
collateral),  the debtor's  estate would  be forced  to internalize  more
(if not  all)  of the  cost  that rejection  imposes  on the  other  party,
giving  the  debtor's  estate  a  greater  incentive  to  perform  value-
creating  contracts.  And,  if  the  trustee  were  to  reject,  the  non-
bankrupt  party  would  receive  more  compensation  than  if it  were
unsecured.  Thus  one  might believe  that  if rejection  under the RD
rule  is  expected  to be  costly  to  the  contracting  parties,  the parties
simply would  take security  interests in each  other's assets  to effec-
tively  "opt out"  of the  RD rule.
But  two  parties  to  a  contract  are  generally  unlikely  to  use
security  interests  even  if, in the event  of bankruptcy,  the  RD rule
would impose  a significant  cost  on  one  of them. First, a  firm may
not  have  sufficient  unencumbered  assets  to  routinely  collateralize
the  dozens  or  hundreds  of  non-loan  contracts  it  may  enter  into
each  year.  Second,  even  if there  were  sufficient  collateral,  the  use
of  a  security interest  would  be  costly:  the security  interest  would
tie  up  the  assets  serving  as  collateral,  restricting  the  granting
party's  ability  to  transfer,  sell,  or pledge  the  assets  serving  as  col-
lateral  in  order  to  enter  into  new  projects  or pay  for current  ex-
penses.86  There  would  also  be  substantial  transaction  expenses
associated  with  creating  and  maintaining  a  valid  security  inter-
est.'  The  costs  associated  with  the  use  of  a  security  interest
would  be  incurred  by  the parties  whether  or  not either  party  en-
ters bankruptcy.
In  contrast,  the  cost  of  rejection  by  one  party  ("Firm  A")
would be  borne  by the  other party ("Firm  B")  only if:  1) Firm  A
enters  bankruptcy while  the contract  is  still  executory;  2) Firm A's
bankruptcy  estate is better  off rejecting  the contract  than perform-
ing;  and  3)  the  rejection  causes  a  loss  to  Firm  B.88  The  proba-
bility  that  a  typical  firm  will  enter  bankruptcy  during  the  term  of
86.  See Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  & Jesse  M. Fried,  The  Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105  YALE  LJ. 857,  878  (1996);  F. H.  Buckley,  The Bank.
ruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72  VA.  L. REv. 1393,  1437-39  (1986);  George  G.  Triantis,  Secured
Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  225,  247-48  (1992).
87.  See  Bebchuk  &  Fried, supra note  86,  at 877-78.
88.  This  analysis  assumes  that  the  owners  of Firm  A  do  not  benefit  from  rejection,
that  is,  that  all  of the  benefit  from  rejection  under the  RD  rule  flows  to  the  firm's  unse-
cured  creditors.  To  the  extent  Firm  A's  owners  do  benefit  from  rejection,  then  the  net
loss  imposed  on  the  owners  of Firm  A  and  Firm  B  by  the  RD  rule  is  the  loss  to  Firm
B  less  the  benefit  received  by  the  owners of Firm  A  in  bankruptcy.
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any  particular  contract  may  well  be  rather  small,  and  the  likeli-
hood  that  all  three  of  these  conditions  will  be  met  may,  for  a
typical  firm, therefore  be  negligible.  As  a result, the expected cost
of  the  RD  rule  in  the  typical  transaction  may  well  be  very
small.89  Thus,  even  if rejection  under  the RD  rule  would  be  very
costly to  the parties  if it occurs, using  security  interests to contract
around the RD rule  may not be worthwhile. The apparently  infre-
quent  use  of  security  interests  in  connection  with  non-loan  con-
tracts  thus  cannot  be  taken  as  evidence  that, once  the  firm  is  in
bankruptcy,  the problem  of value-wasting  rejection  under  the  RD
rule  is insignificant.9 0
II.  JUDICIAL  LIMITATIONS  ON  REJECTION
Part  I  explained  why  the  ability  of the  bankruptcy  estate  to
reject without  compensating the other party in full can provide  the
estate  with  an  incentive  to  reject  certain  value-creating  contracts.
This Part  explores one possible  approach to  eliminating the result-
ing  problem  of  excessive  rejection:  prohibiting  trustees  from  re-
jecting  any  contract  that  the  court  determines  would  be  value-
creating.
Under  current  law,  a  bankruptcy  court  has  the  authority  to
prevent  a trustee from  assuming  or rejecting  an executory  contract
under  Section  365.91  Nevertheless,  the  decision  whether  to  reject
a contract  is  usually  left to  the business  judgment  of the trustee.9 2
89.  If  one  of the  contracting  firms  is financially  distressed,  the  expected  cost  of  the
RD  rule  would,  of course,  be higher.
90.  It has been  suggested  to me  that  another approach  to  opting  out of the  RD  rule
would  be  to  incorporate  into  a  contract  a  liquidated  damages  clause  that  increases  the
nonbankrupt  party's  claim  by  an  amount  sufficient  to  ensure  that  application  of the  RD
rule  to  the  damage  claim  would  yield  a  payment  to the  nonbankrupt  party  equal  to  its
actual  damages  (to  ensure  such  an  outcome,  the  clause  would  stipulate  that  the
nonbankrupt  party  is  entitled  to  expectation  damages  divided  by  the  payout  rate  for
unsecured  claims).  However,  such  a  "gross-up"  clause  is unlikely  to be  enforceable  under
current  law.  First,  the  effect  of rejection  is generally  to disable  liquidated  damages  claus-
es.  See, e.g.,  In re TransAmerican  Natural  Gas  Corp.,  79  B.R.  663,  667  (Bankr.  S.D. Tex.
1987)  (finding  that  enforcing  the  liquidated  damages  clause  would  effectively  enforce  the
rejected  contract).  Second,  such  a  clause  might  also  be  considered  inoperative  under  11
U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)  (which  strikes  down  any  contract  provision  that  is conditioned  on  the
debtor  entering bankruptcy).  And  even if a  "gross-up"  clause  could  be enforced,  it  would
not  be  effective  unless  there  were  sufficient  assets  to pay  the  resulting  claim.
91.  See  11  U.S.C.  § 365(a)  (1994).
92.  See, e.g.,  In re TS  Indus.,  Inc.,  117  B.R.  682,  685  (Bankr.  D.  Utah  1990)  (apply-
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This  hands-off  approach  is  generally  supported  by  bankruptcy
commentators,  who  believe  that two  of the important  purposes  of
Section  365-maximizing  the  value  of  the  estate  and  assisting  in
the rehabilitation  of the debtor-are  well served  by permitting  the
trustee  to  choose whichever  course  of action  she  believes  is  in the
best interest  of the  estate.93
However,  bankruptcy  courts  occasionally  refuse  to  give  a
trustee  permission  to  reject  a  contract.  When  denying  the  trustee
permission  to  reject, the court  will usually  invoke one  of two doc-
trines,  the "burdensome  test"  doctrine  or the "balancing  test"  doc-
trine,  each  of  which  specifies  situations  in  which  rejection  should
not  be  allowed.  In  Section  A,  I  describe  the  "burdensome  test"
doctrine  and  examine  how incorporating  this  doctrine  into  Section
365 would  affect the level of desirable performance  in bankruptcy.
As we  will  see,  incorporating  the "burdensome  test"  doctrine  into
Section  365  would not always  prevent  the  trustee from  rejecting  a
value-wasting  contract.
Section  B describes  and analyzes  the "balancing  test" doctrine.
It explains  that incorporating  the  "balancing  test" doctrine  as  it is
currently  formulated  into  Section  365  would  not  always  prevent
the trustee from rejecting  a value-creating  contract, but that  incor-
porating  a  modified  "balancing  test"  into  Section  365  could  pre-
vent  the  trustee  from  rejecting  any  value-creating  contract.  Al-
though  incorporation  of  such  a  modified  "balancing  test"  into
Section  365 could,  in principle,  eliminate  any  problem  of  excessive
rejection under the RD rule, Section B  also identifies  certain prob-
lems  with  this  approach  to solving  the  problem  of  excessive  rejec-
tion that may make it both  undesirable  and ineffective.
A.  The  "Burdensome Test" Doctrine
The  doctrine  that  is  most frequently  invoked  by  courts  deny-
ing  permission  to  reject  is  the  "burdensome  test"  doctrine.  Under
this  doctrine,  a trustee  is not permitted  to reject  a  contract  unless
performance  would cause  an absolute reduction in the value  of the
estate.94  In  other  words,  the  estate  may  not  reject  an  executory
contract whose  performance  would  increase  the value  of the estate
93.  See  Andrew, supra note 28,  at 895-96;  Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at 249-51.
94.  See  In re  Jackson  Brewing  Co.,  567  F.2d  618,  621  (5th  Cir.  1978);  In  re Stable
Mews  Assocs.,  Inc.  41  B.R.  594,  596  (Bankr.  S.D.N.Y.  1984).
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in  order  to  enter  into  another  arrangement  that would  make  the
estate even better  off.
To illustrate  the operation  of the  "burdensome  test"  doctrine,
suppose  that Firm  has  agreed  to  pay  Builder  A  $100  to  build  a
factory;  that  the  factory  would  cost  Builder  A  $60  to  construct;
and  that Firm  would  value  the factory  at  $120.  At the time  Firm
enters  bankruptcy,  neither  party  has  performed  or  paid.  Shortly
thereafter,  Builder  B  appears,  offering  to  construct  an  identical
factory  for a  price  of $90.  Under  the "burdensome  test"  doctrine,
Firm would not be permitted to reject  the contract  with Builder A
because  performance  of the original  contract would not reduce the
value  of the  estate  but  rather  increase  it by  $20  (the value  Firm
would  place  on  the  factory,  $120,  less  the  price  of  the  factory
under the  contract with Builder A, $100).
Application  of  the  "burdensome  test"  doctrine  can in  certain
cases  prevent value-wasting rejection.  Suppose that, in the example
above,  the cost to  Builder  B  of building  the factory  would be  $80
($20  more  than  the cost  to  Builder A).  In  that case,  rejection  of
the  contract  with  Builder  A  would  cause  Builder  A  to  lose  $40
($100  - $60)  in  profits,  while providing  Builder  B  with  $10  ($90  -
$80)  in  profits  and  reducing  Firm's  building  costs  by  $10  ($100  -
$90).  Since rejection  would  reduce  total value  by  $20  ($40  - $10  -
$10),  application  of  the  "burdensome  test"  to  prevent  rejection
would thus yield a  desirable result.
However,  the  "burdensome  test"  doctrine  could  not  prevent
value-wasting  rejection in many cases. Recall that the "burdensome
test" would  apply  only when  performance  of  the  original contract
would  increase the  value  of  the  estate.  A  trustee  would  seek  to
reject  such  a contract  only when  there  is  a  possibility  of  entering
into  an  even  more  beneficial  arrangement.  Many  rejections  are
likely  to involve  contracts  the performance  of which  would  reduce
the  value  of  the  estate.  In  these  cases,  the  "burdensome  test"
would  not  apply,  and  therefore  could  not  prevent  value-wasting
rejection.
Moreover,  the  application  of  the  "burdensome  test"  doctrine
could  actually  prevent  the  rejection  of  value-wasting  contracts.
Returning  to  our  example,  suppose  that  the  cost  to  Builder  B  of
building  the factory would not be $80  but rather  $40 ($20  less than
the cost  to Builder A). In that  case, rejection  of the contract  with
Builder  A  (and  performance  of the  $90  contract  with  Builder  B)
would, as before,  cause Builder A to lose  $40 in profits, but wouldDUKE LAW JOURNAL
provide  Builder  B  with  $50  ($90  - $40)  in  profits  and  reduce
Firm's  building  costs  by  $10.  As  a  result, rejection  of the contract
with Builder A  would  create  a  net gain of  $20  ($50  + $10  - $40).
Application  of  the  "burdensome  test"  to  deny  rejection  would
therefore  yield  a worse outcome  than if the rejection  decision were
left to the trustee's  discretion.
In short, the  analysis  I have offered  indicates  that incorporat-
ing  the  "burdensome  test"  into  Section  365  would  not  solve  the
problem  of  excessive  rejection  under  the RD rule  and might  actu-
ally reduce the overall  level of desirable performance  in bankrupt-
cy.
95
B.  The  "Balancing Test" Doctrine
The  second of the  two  doctrines  invoked  to prevent  a trustee
from  rejecting  an  executory  contract  is  the  "balancing  test"  doc-
trine. Under this  doctrine,  the trustee is not permitted  to reject  an
executory  contract  if the damage  to the other party from rejection
would be  disproportionately  greater  than the  benefit to  the estate.
For  example,  in  the  case  of In  re Petur U.S.A.  Instrument Co., 96
the  bankruptcy  trustee  was  not  permitted  to  "reject"  (which  the
court  interpreted  to  mean  "cancel,"  not  merely  "breach"' )  a  li-
cense  agreement,  on  grounds  that  cancellation  of the  agreement
would  destroy the licensee's  business  while providing  only specula-
tive  benefit to the  estate's creditors."
The  "balancing  test" doctrine,  which  is justified  on  grounds  of
equity,99  actually  serves  as  a  (partial)  efficiency  test.  When  it  is
95.  Raymond  Nimmer  has suggested  applying  a modified  "burdensome  test"  to  exec-
utory  contracts  for "unique"  goods  for the  purpose  of making  other  parties  more  willing
to  enter  into  contracts  with  financially  distressed  firms.  See  Nimmer,  supra note  6,  at
529-30.  Nimmer  would  require  that  a  bankrupt  debtor  perform  if  1) performance  is  not
burdensome  to  the  bankruptcy  estate;  2)  performance  is  feasible  within  the  bankruptcy
proceeding  (long-term  performance  would  not  be  considered  feasible  where  the  trustee
seeks  to  liquidate);  and  3)  the  nonbankrupt  party  has  relied  on the  debtor's  promise. See
id. while  Nimmer's  rule  would  be  more  favorable  to  financially  distressed  firms  in  bank-
ruptcy  than  the  currently-used  "burdensome  test",  it  would  lead  to  two  distortions  in
bankruptcy. First,  as  under the  current  rule,  the trustee  may be  required  to  perform  even
if performance  is  inefficient.  Second, in  certain  cases,  Nimmer's  rule  could  give  the  trust-,
ee  an  incentive  to  inefficiently  liquidate  the  debtor  in  order  to  avoid  performance  of  a
burdensome  but value-creating  contract.
96.  35  B.R. 561  (Bankr. W.D.  Wash.  1983).
97.  See supra note  25  and  accompanying  text.
98.  See  In re Petur, 35  B.R.  at 563.
99.  See  id. at 564.
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applied,  it  prevents  the  estate  from  rejecting  when  rejection  is
especially  value-wasting.  As  such, the  doctrine  increases the  level
of value-creating  performance  under Section  365, a benefit that has
been overlooked  by the commentators  critical  of its use."
As  currently  formulated,  the  "balancing  test"  doctrine  applies
only when  the cost of rejection to  the nonbankrupt  party would be
greatly  disproportionate  to the benefit received by the  estate. Thus
the  "balancing  test"  currently  can  at best prevent  only highly  val-
ue-wasting  rejection.  When  rejection  would  result  in  harm  to  the
nonbankrupt  party that is greater, but not disproportionately  great-
er,  than the  benefit  to the  estate,  the "balancing  test" would  per-
mit  rejection  of  a value-creating  contract.  This  problem  could  be
eliminated by requiring  the court to  deny the trustee permission  to
reject  whenever  the  cost  of  rejection  to  the  nonbankrupt  party
would  be even  slightly greater  than the benefit  to  the estate.  This
modified  "balancing  test"  could  solve  the  problem  of  excessive
rejection.
Unfortunately,  there  would  be  at  least  two  problems  with
incorporating  a  modified  "balancing  test"  into  Section  365.  The
first  is  that  such  a  rule  would  be  inconsistent  with  two  of  the
important  purposes  behind  Section  365-to  spread  the  loss  occa-
sioned  by the  debtor's  default  as equally  as possible  and  to  assist
in the rehabilitation  of the  debtor. Under  an improved  "balancing
test" rule,  a court  could require  the estate  to perform  unfavorable
value-creating  contracts  that the  estate would  have  rejected  under
the  RD  rule.  Performance  under  these  circumstances  would  shift
some  of the  loss  that would  have  been  borne  by  the  other  party
to  the contract  under the RD rule to the debtor's unsecured  credi-
tors,  undercutting  the  norm  of  equal  treatment.'0'  Forcing  the
estate  to  perform  an  unfavorable  contract  that  it  would  have  re-
jected  under  the  RD  rule  would  also  deplete  the  assets  of  the
estate, making rehabilitation  more  difficult."°
The  second  (and  perhaps  more)  significant  problem  with  the
use  of  a modified  "balancing  test"  under Section  365  is  that while
100.  See,  e.g.,  Andrew, supra note 28,  at  898-99.
101.  The  current  "balancing  test"  doctrine  has  been  criticized  for  violating  the  bank-
ruptcy  norm  of equal treatment.  See  Andrew, supra note 28,  at 898-99.  See  also Nimmer,
supra note  6,  at  528-29  (observing  that  requiring  the  estate  to  perform  a  contract  would
violate the  bankruptcy  norms  of rehabilitation  and  equal  treatment).
102.  See Nimmer,  supra note  6,  at 528-29.544  DUKE LAW JO URNAL  [Vol. 46:517
in  principle  such  a  rule  would  prevent  value-wasting  rejection,  in
practice  it may  be difficult  to  enforce.  In particular,  if claims  aris-
ing from  the breach  of  a contract  prior  to  bankruptcy  are  treated
as  any other  prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim,  then  a firm  entering
bankruptcy  could  easily  avoid  specific  performance  of  a  value-
creating  contract  under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule  by
breaching  any time prior  to filing for bankruptcy."°
103.  It  might  appear  that  another  problem  with  incorporating  the modified  "balancing
test"  rule  into  Section  365  is  that  such  a  rule  would  increase  the  total  litigation  costs
associated  with  resolving  disputes  over  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy.  However,  this
need  not be  the  case.
As  under  the  RD  rule,  litigation  could  occur  under  the  modified  "balancing  test"
rule  whenever  the  trustee  seeks  to  reject  (or  the  nonbankrupt  party  breaches).  The
nonbankrupt  party  would  breach  with  the  same  frequency  under  both  the  RD  rule  and
modified  "balancing  test,"  since  under both  rules it  would  be  required  to  pay  full  expec-
tation  damages.  However,  there  would  be  less  rejection  under  the  modified  "balancing
test"  rule  than  the  RD  rule.  For  while  under  the  RD  rule  the  trustee  has  an  incentive
to  reject  whenever  rejection  makes  the  estate  better  off  than  performance,  under  the
modified  "balancing  test"  rule  the  trustee  would  have  an  incentive  to  reject  only  when
rejection  would  make  the  estate  better  off than  performance  and the  trustee  believes  that
the  court  would  uphold  its  decision  to  reject,  should  the  other  party  contest  it.  Conse-
quently,  the  frequency  of litigation would  be  lower  under  the  modified  "balancing  test"
rule  than under  the  RD  rule.
But  when the  trustee would  seek  to  reject  under the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule
and  the nonbankrupt  party challenges  the  rejection,  the  court  would  be required  to  deter-
mine  both  the  cost  of performance  to  the  estate  and  the  value  of  performance  to  the
nonbankrupt  party. Under  the  RD  rule,  the  court  need  calculate  only  the  value  of per-
formance  to  the nonbankrupt  party.  The cost per case may  therefore  be  higher  under the
modified  "balancing  test"  rule  than  under the  RD  rule.  As  a  result, total litigation costs
under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule  could  be  higher  or  lower  than  under  the  RD
rule.
Nor  would  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule  delay  performance  in  bankruptcy
(relative  to  the  RD rule).  Under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule,  there would  be cases
in  which:  1) rejection  would  make  the  estate  better  off than  performance;  2)  the  trustee
believes  that  the  court  would  uphold  its  rejection  decision  if  challenged;  3)  the  other
party  believes  that  the  court  would  compel  the  estate  to  perform;  and  4)  the  court  in
fact  compels  the  estate  to  perform.  Since  litigation would  precede  performance  only  when
rejection  would  have  made  the  estate  better  off, litigation  would  arise  under the  modified
"balancing  test"  rule  only  in  those  cases  where  the  trustee  would  have  simply  rejected
the  contract  under  the  RD  rule.  Thus,  relative  to  the  RD  rule,  the  modified  "balancing
test" rule  would  not  delay  performance.
In  fact,  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule  could  lead  to  earlier  performance  than
the  RD  rule.  The  reason  is  that  the  trustee  would  need  less  information  to  make  her
decision  under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule  than  under  the  RD  rule.  To  see  why
this  is  the  case, assume  that  performance  would  be  costly to  the  estate,  but  would  bene-
fit the nonbankrupt  party. Under the  RD  rule,  the  trustee  must  estimate  the  payout  rate
for  unsecured  claims,  the  value  to  the  other  party  of performance,  and  the  cost  to  the
estate  of  performance  in  order  to  determine  whether  rejection  would  be  more  or  less
costly  than performance.  Under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  rule,  the  trustee  would  be1996]  EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY  545
III.  ELIMINATING  THE  UNDERLYING  DISTORTION  IN  FAVOR  OF
REJECTION:  THE  PRICE-ADJUSTMENT  APPROACH
A.  Towards the Price-Adjustment Approach
Part  II  described  one  possible  approach  to  eliminating  the
problem  of  excessive  rejection  in  bankruptcy:  denying  the  trustee
permission  to  reject  an  executory  contract  that  the  court  deter-
mines  would  be  value-creating.  It  explained  that  one  of  the  two
doctrines  currently used by courts to prevent a trustee from  reject-
ing  under  Section  365-the  "balancing  test"  doctrine-could  be
modified to achieve  this result. Unfortunately, the use of the modi-
fied  "balancing  test" rule  in Section 365  would suffer from at least
two problems:  1) it would be inconsistent with two  of the purposes
behind  Section  365-assisting  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  debtor
and  spreading  more  widely  the  loss  caused  by  the  failure  of the
debtor;  and 2) it could be  easily circumvented-a firm contemplat-
ing  bankruptcy  could  avoid  performing  an  unfavorable  but value-
creating  contract by breaching the contract prior  to bankruptcy.
This Part explores  a different  approach to  solving the problem
of  excessive  rejection  in  bankruptcy:  eliminating  the  underlying
distortion  in  favor  of rejection  and  leaving  the  performance  deci-
sion  to  the  trustee.  A useful  way  to  think about  this  distortion  is
as follows:  under the ED  rule, the relative cost  of nonperformance
(the cost  of nonperformance  relative to the cost of performance)  is
high  enough  so  that  each  party  has  an  incentive  to  perform  any
contract  that  is  value-creating  (but  not  so  high  that  either  party
has  an incentive  to perform  a contract  that is value-wasting).  The
RD  rule,  by  not  requiring  the  estate  to  compensate  the  other
party in full for  any  damages  resulting  from rejection,  reduces  the
relative  cost of nonperformance.  This reduction in the relative  cost
of  nonperformance  creates  the  distortion  in  favor  of  rejection.
Eliminating  the  distortion  in favor  of  rejection  therefore  requires
required  to  estimate  only  the  value  to  the  other  party  and  the  cost  to  the  estate  of
performance.  If the  trustee  determines  that  the  value  of performance  to  the  other  party
exceeds  the  cost  of  performance  to  the  estate,  the  trustee  would  have  an  incentive  to
perform  (because  she  would  believe  that  the  court  would  not  uphold  a  decision  to  re-
ject).  Otherwise,  the  trustee  would  have  an  incentive  to  reject.  Since  the  court's  decision
would  be  independent  of  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims,  the  payout  rate  would
have  much  less  effect  on  the  trustee's  decision  to  perform  or  reject  under  the  "balancing
test"  rule.  Thus,  the  trustee  would  have  less  of  an  incentive  to  delay  the  decision  in
order  to  obtain  a better  estimate  of the  payout  rate.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
increasing  the  relative  cost  of  nonperformance  to  its  level  under
the ED rule.
One straightforward approach  to increasing  the relative cost  of
nonperformance  to its  appropriate  level would  be to raise  the  cost
of nonperformance  to  its  level  under  the  ED  rule:  that is,  to  re-
quire the  estate  to pay expectation  damages  in the event of rejec-
tion." 3  Such  a  rule  would  give  the  trustee  the  same  performance
incentives  as  a (solvent) party outside of bankruptcy. It would  thus
ensure  that if the  decision  is left  in the  hands  of the  trustee,  the
trustee  would have an incentive  to perform  if the contract  is value
creating.
However,  the  use  of  the  ED  rule  under  Section  365  would
suffer from the same problems  as the use  of the modified  "balanc-
ing  test."  First,  the  ED  rule  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  two
important  purposes  that  are  offered  for  Section  365  and,  indeed,
for  the bankruptcy  system as a whole:  to enhance  the value  of the
estate  and  to  spread  equitably  the loss  occasioned  by  the  debtor's
default."  The  use  of  an  ED  rule  in  bankruptcy  would  be  even
more  problematic,  at least  in  terms  of  undermining  the norm  of
equal treatment.  Relative  to the RD rule,  the modified  "balancing
test"  rule  would  shift  the loss  from the  other  party to  the  execu-
tory  contract  to  the  debtor's  unsecured  creditors  only  when  the
estate  is  compelled  to  perform  a  value-creating  contract  that  it
would  have rejected under the RD rule. The  ED rule, in  contrast,
would  shift  the  loss  to  the  debtor's  unsecured  creditors  when  the
estate performs  a value-creating  contract that it would have reject-
ed  under  the RD  rule  as  well  as  when  the  estate  rejects  a value-
wasting  contract  that  it  would  have  also  rejected  under  the  RD
rule.1
6
104.  This  is the  solution  offered  by George  Triantis  in his  analysis  of the  problem  of
excessive  rejection.  See Triantis,  supra note  2,  at  696.
105.  See  Elizabeth  Warren,  Bankruptcy Policy, 54  U.  CHL  L. REv.  775,  790-92  (1987);
Westbrook,  supra note  8,  at  227.  This  point  is  acknowledged  by  Triantis  as  well.  See
Triantis,  supra note  2,  at 696.
106.  The  ED  rule  would  not  necessarily  make  rehabilitation  more  difficult  than  the
use  of the  modified  "balancing  test"  under Section  365. The  reason  for  this  is  as  follows:
under both  rules,  all  unfavorable  value-creating  contracts  are  (in principle)  performed  and
all  unfavorable  value-wasting  contracts  are  rejected.  As  a  result,  the  only  difference  be-
tween  the  rules  is  that  the  other party has  a  larger  claim  under the  ED  rule  than under
the  modified  "balancing  test" in  the  event  of rejection.
However, claims  arising  from rejection  do not deplete  the  assets  of the  estate.  They
become  claims  against  those  assets  that  are  paid  at  the  end  of the  bankruptcy  proceed-
ing.  Thus,  while  the  total  claims  against  the  estate  would  be  higher  under  the  ED  rule
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Second, as  long as  claims arising from a prebankruptcy  breach
were  still  subject  to  the  RD  rule  (just  like  any  other  prebank-
ruptcy  unsecured  claim),  a  firm  anticipating  bankruptcy  could
easily  circumvent  an  ED  rule  under  Section  365  by  breaching
some time before it enters bankruptcy."°
Requiring  the estate to pay expectation  damages  is,  of course,
not  the  only  means  of increasing  the  relative  cost  of  nonperfor-
mance  to its  appropriate  level.  Another  way to  increase  the  rela-
tive cost  of nonperformance  to that which would prevail  under the
ED  rule would be to reduce the cost  of performance  by an appro-
priate  amount. I  call  this  the "price-adjustment"  approach.  Below,
I put forward  and  analyze  three  rules  that  embody  this  approach:
1) the  RD/Adjusted Price rule, which  adjusts the price  in favor of
the bankruptcy  estate  by an  amount  sufficient  to offset the  distor-
tion  in  favor  of  breach  under  the  RD  rule  (Section  B);  2)  the
ND/Adjusted  Price  rule,  which  gives  the  estate  a  choice  between
paying  no  damages  for  rejection  or  performing  at  a  price  that
gives  the  bankruptcy  estate  all  of  the  value  created  by  perfor-
mance  (Section  C);  and  3)  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule,  which
modifies  the  contract  price  and  then  gives  the  trustees  a  choice
between  performing  at  the  modified  price  or  paying  expectation
damages  (Section D).  My  aim  is  not  to  advocate  the  adoption  of
any  of  these  rules  in  particular,  or  of  the  price-adjustment  ap-
proach  in general, but rather  to begin  exploring the costs  and ben-
efits of  these three  price-adjustment  rules  relative  to the RD  rule.
In principle,  all three  of  the price-adjustment  rules  considered
lead to more desirable  performance  than the RD rule.  As  we will
see,  however, some of the price-adjustment  rules  could  give rise to
more frequent  litigation,  and higher  litigation  costs,  than  the  RD
rule.  Such  litigation  could  delay  (and,  if the delay is  long  enough,
than  under  the  modified  "balancing  test"  (and  thus  the  payout  for  unsecured  claims
would  be  lower),  the  two  rules  would  not  have  different  effects  on  the  value  of  the
estate's  assets  (and,  therefore,  on  the  ability  of the  debtor  to  rehabilitate  itself).
107.  See,  eg.,  Lynn  M.  LoPucki,  Comment, Stakeholder Interests in  Bankruptcy, 43  U.
TORONTO  LJ. 711,  715  (1993).  LoPucki  also  points  out  that  a  firm  that  finds  itself with
an  unfavorable  executory  contract  in  bankruptcy  under  the  ED  rule  could  dismiss  its
bankruptcy  case,  breach  the  contract,  and  then  refile  for bankruptcy  sometime  later.  See
id. One  could  adopt  a  reach-back  provision  under which  claims  arising  from  breaches  in
anticipation  of  bankruptcy  are  paid  full  damages.  In  principle,  such  a  reach-back  provi-
sion  would  prevent  debtors  from  circumventing  an  ED  rule  under  Section  365.  In  prac-
tice,  however,  it  would  be  difficult  to  distinguish  between  breaches  that  were  made  in
anticipation  of bankruptcy  and  those  that  were not.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
prevent)  performance,  reducing  the rules'  effectiveness  in practice.
Therefore,  I  will  pay  attention  to  the  litigation  costs  associated
with  each  rule  and  the  effect  of litigation  under  each  rule  on  the
timing of performance  in bankruptcy.
In  examining  litigation  costs  and  the  effect  of each  price-ad-
justment  rule  on  the  timing  of  performance  in  bankruptcy,  my
baseline  for comparison  will be  the RD  rule.  When  the trustee  is
given  complete  discretion under  the RD  rule,  there  might  be  liti-
gation  only  if  rejection  by  the  trustee  (or  breach  by  the  other
party)  gives  rise  to  a  damage  claim."°  There  would  be  no  need
for  litigation  if  the parties  proceed  with  performance  or mutually
abandon"°  the  contract.  As  a  result,  any  litigation  that  arises
under the RD rule  does not delay performance.
In  the  analysis  of the three  price-adjustment  rules  I  will  also
pay attention  to the ex post distributional  effects  of the rules,  that
is,  how  the  rules  allocate  value  between  the  debtor's  bankruptcy
estate  and  the  other  party to  the  executory  contract.1  This  is  of
concern  because  increasing  the  assets  of  the  bankruptcy  estate
facilitates  the  debtor's  reorganization,  an  important  purpose  of
bankruptcy  law."'  In  the  discussion  of  each rule's  ex post distrib-
utional  effects,  the baseline  for  comparison  again  will  be  the  RD
rule.  As  explained,  the  RD  rule  transfers  value  from  the  non-
bankrupt  party  only  when  the  trustee  rejects  an  executory  con-
tract."
2
The  ex post distributional  effects  of  each rule  are  also  impor-
tant because  they affect  the parties'  decisions  prior to bankruptcy.
In analyzing  each  rule,  I will consider  one important  effect  that  is
likely  to  vary  among  them:  the  effect  of the  rule  on  the  timing
and  nature  of performance  decisions  in  anticipation  of  bankrupt-
cy.  In  analyzing  these  performance  decisions,  I  assume  that  the
108.  There  need  not  be litigation,  of  course;  the  parties  would  have  at  least  until  the
end  of the  bankruptcy  proceeding  to  settle  a  claim  out-of-court.
109.  For purposes  of the  analysis,  I use  "rejection"  to  refer  to  the  case  in  which  the
trustee  refuses  to  perform  a  contract  that  would  make  the  nonbankrupt  party  better  off,
"breach"  to  refer  to  the  case  in which  the  other party  refuses  to  perform  a  contract  that
would  make  the  estate  better off, and  "mutual  abandonment"  to  refer  to  the  situation  in
which  both  parties  walk  away  from  the  contract  because  performance  would  make  both
worse  off.
110.  There  may  of course  be  ex ante price  adjustments  at the  time  of contracting  that
at  least  partially  compensate  the  other party  for these  ex post effects.
111.  See  supra notes  101-02  and  accompanying  text.
112.  See  supra Section  I.A.
113.  These  rules  will  also  affect  other  decisions  outside  of  bankruptcy,  including  the
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management  of each firm (like the trustee  of the debtor's  estate in
bankruptcy)  is seeking to maximize  the value  of the firm."4
The  treatment  of  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy  could
have  two  types  of effects  on performance  decisions  in  anticipation
of bankruptcy.  First,  it could  affect  only the  timing  of the  perfor-
mance  decision  (but  not  the  decision  itself)."  Second,  it  could
affect  both  the timing  and  the  nature  of  the  decision."6  Some  of
these effects-for  example,  causing  a firm to perform  inside bank-
ruptcy  instead of breaching  outside bankruptcy-may  be  desirable.
Others-for  example,  causing  a firm to  breach outside  bankruptcy
instead  of performing  inside  bankruptcy-are  clearly not."7
In  analyzing  the  effect  of  each  of the  price-adjustment  rules
on  performance  decisions  in  anticipation  of  bankruptcy,  the  RD
rule  will  again  serve  as the  benchmark.  Under  the RD  rule,  nei-
ther  party  should  have  an  incentive  to  delay  performance  until
bankruptcy  because  the  terms  of  performance  in  bankruptcy  are
the  same  as  outside  of bankruptcy.  Likewise,  neither  party  is bet-
ter  off  delaying  or  accelerating  breach.  As  a result,  the  RD  rule
decision  to  declare  bankruptcy  and  whether  to  enter  into  an  executory  contract  with
another  firm.  See  infra Part  IV.
114.  For  convenience,  I  also  assume  that the  party  entering  bankruptcy  must pay  (or
perform)  prior to  receiving  performance  (or  payment)  from  the  other party.
115.  The  treatment  of executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy  could  1)  cause  a  party  that
would  have  performed  (breached)  outside  bankruptcy  to  delay performance  (breach)  until
bankruptcy  or  2)  cause  a  party  that  would  have  breached  inside  bankruptcy  to  breach
outside  bankruptcy  (I  assume  that while  a  party  can  unilaterally  choose  to  breach  before
it or  the  other party  declares  bankruptcy,  it  cannot  compel  the  other party  to  accelerate
performance).  The  timing  of  the  performance  decision  may have  efficiency  consequences.
See  Craswell,  supra note 58,  at 632-40.
116.  The  treatment  of  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy  could  1) cause  a  party  that
would  have  breached  outside  bankruptcy  to  perform  inside  bankruptcy  or  2)  cause  a
party  that  would  have  performed  inside  bankruptcy  to breach  outside  bankruptcy.
117.  If  a  party  must  make  its  performance  decision  prior  to  bankruptcy,  then  the
decision  will  not  be  affected  by  the  executory  contract  rule  in  bankruptcy.  Consider  the
choice  facing  a  financially  distressed  firm  that  anticipates  entering  bankruptcy,  assuming
that  it  must  pay  (or  perform)  prior  to  receiving  performance  (or  payment)  from  the
other  party.  If the  financially  distressed  firm  breaches,  payment  of  any  breach  claim  can
be  delayed  until  bankruptcy,  at  which  point  the  breach  claim  will  be  treated  like  any
other  prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim  and  paid  less  than  its  face  amount.  Consequently,
the  financially  distressed  firm  has  the  same  type  of  incentive  to  reject  value-creating
contracts  outside  of  bankruptcy  as  it  would  inside  bankruptcy  under  the  RD  rule.  This
distortion  would  arise  under  any  regime  where  unsecured  claims  that  arise  before  bank-
ruptcy  need  not  be  paid  in  full,  regardless  of  the  treatment  of  executory  contracts  in
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should  have  no  effect  on  the  timing  and  nature  of performance
decisions  shortly  before bankruptcy.
B.  The Ratable Damages/Adjusted Price Rule
1.  The  Operation of the  RD/Adjusted  Price Rule.  The  first
price  adjustment  rule  considered  is what  I  call  the  "ratable  dam-
ages  and  adjusted  price"  ("RD/Adjusted  Price")  rule.  Under  the
ordinary RD rule,  once  a bankruptcy  estate  chooses to perform  an
executory  contract,  the  estate  becomes  subject  to  the  same  con-
tract  rules  that  prevail  outside  of  bankruptcy."'  That  is,  the  es-
tate  must  perform  according  to  the  contract's  original  terms  (or
pay  damages  in full).  However, if the  trustee  rejects  the  contract,
the estate generally  need  pay only  a small  portion  of  any damages
sustained  by  the  other  party.  As  Part  I  explained,  the  resulting
reduction  in  the  relative  cost  of  nonperformance  distorts  the
trustee's  choice  in favor of rejection.
The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  like  the  RD  rule,  allows  the
estate  to treat  the  other party's  damage  claim  as  a prebankruptcy
unsecured  claim,  thereby  reducing  the  cost  of  rejection  by  the
same  amount  as  the  RD  rule.  However,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price
rule restores  the relative  cost of nonperformance  to its  appropriate
level by making an offsetting  adjustment to the  contract price. The
size  of this  adjustment  is  exactly  equal  to  the  amount  of  the re-
duction  in  the  cost  of  nonperformance  under  the  RD  rule-no
more  and no less.'19
Example.  To  illustrate  the  operation  of the  RD/Adjusted  Price
rule,  suppose  again  that Firm has  agreed  to pay Builder  $100  for
construction  of  a  factory  that  would  cost  Builder  $60  to  build.
118.  See supra notes 36-37  and  accompanying  text.
119.  Any  less  of an  adjustment  would  not  eliminate  the  distortion  in  favor  of rejec-
tion;  any more  of an adjustment  would  eliminate  the  distortion  in  favor  of rejection,  but
create  a  distortion  in  favor  of  performance.  For  example,  consider  a  rule  requiring  that
the  other  party  perform  and  then  treating  the  other  party's  claim  for  payment  as  a
prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim  against  the  estate.  See  Nimmer,  supra note  6,  at  512.
Under  such  a  rule,  the  cost  of performance  to  the  estate  of a  bankrupt  buyer  would  be
reduced  by  a  fraction  (equal  to  1  - x,  where  x  is  the  payout  fraction  for  unsecured
claims)  of the  contract  price.  As  under the  RD  rule,  the  cost  of nonperformance  would
be reduced  by that  fraction  (1 - x)  of the  nonbankrupt  seller's profits.  The  nonbankrupt
seller's  profits  would  be  some  amount  that  is  less  than  the  contract  price.  Thus,  the
estate  would  receive  a  discount  for  performance  greater  than  the  discount  for  rejection.
As  a  result,  the  estate  would  sometimes  have  an incentive  to  demand  performance  even
when performance  is value-wasting.
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Assume  that  the  expected  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims  is
30%.  In the  event of the  estate's  rejection,  Builder would  there-
fore  have  a  damage  claim  of  $40  ($100  - $60).  However,  under
the  principle  of ratable  damages  the estate  would be required  to
pay  only  30%  of  the  $40  damage  claim-$12.  Thus,  the  cost  of
rejection  to the  estate  would  be  $28 ($40  - $12) less  than under
the ED  rule. The  RD/Adjusted Price rule would therefore  reduce
the  cost to  the estate  of performance  by  an  equal amount  ($28),
so  that  the  estate  would  face  an  adjusted  price  of  $72  ($100  -
$28).  As  a result,  the RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  provide  the
trustee with  a choice  between rejecting  the contract  and purchas-
ing  the factory for  $72.
Since  the RD/Adjusted Price rule  discounts the cost of perfor-
mance  and rejection  by  the same amount relative  to the ED  rule,
it provides  the same  incentives  to the bankruptcy  estate  as the ED
rule  (while making the bankruptcy  estate better  off).
Example. To  illustrate the incentives  created  by the RD/Adjusted
Price  rule, let  us return to  the previous  example,  where the  cost
to Builder would be $60,  rejection damages  would  cost the  estate
$12,  and  the  price  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  be
$72. First, suppose that the estate values the factory  at more than
the  cost  to  Builder  of  producing  the  factory  ($60)-i.e.,  perfor-
mance  would be  value-creating.  Here  there  are  two possibilities:
if the  estate  would  value  the  factory  at  more  than  $72,  perfor-
mance  would  benefit  the  estate  and  the  estate  will  perform.  If
the  estate  would  value  the  factory  at  less  than  $72,  but  more
than  $60,  the estate  would  lose  from  performance.  However,  the
estate  has  an  incentive  to  perform  since  the  loss  from  perfor-
mance  would  be  less  than  the  $12  cost  of rejection.  Thus  when
performance  would  be  value-creating  the  estate  has  an incentive
to perform-the  desirable  result.
Now, suppose that the  estate would  value  the factory  at less
than  $60-and therefore  that  performance  would  be  value-wast-
ing.  In  that  case,  performance  at  the  price  of  $72  would  make
the estate worse off by more than $12.  Since rejection would  cost
only  $12,  the  estate  has  an  incentive  to  reject-the  right  re-
suit.
120
120.  To  illustrate  the operation  of  (and  incentives  created  by)  the RD/Adjusted  Price
rule  when Builder  is  the bankrupt  party,  suppose that  Builder  agrees  to  build Firm a  fac-
tory  for  $100  before  Builder  enters bankruptcy.  Suppose  further that the  cost to Builder's
estate  of  building  the  factory  would  be  $120,  and  that  Firm  would  value  the  factory  at
$150,  so that  Firm's expected  gain from  performance  would  be $50  ($150  - $100).  Finally,DUKE LAW JOURNAL
2.  Litigation and the  Timing of Performance in Bankruptcy.
Like  the  RD  rule,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  could  give  rise  to
litigation  whenever  there  is  breach  or  rejection.  However,  unlike
the  RD  rule,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  could  give  rise  to
litigation  also in the event of performance.  The frequency of litiga-
tion  would  be  higher  than  under  the  RD  rule.  In  the  event  of
litigation,  the court need  determine  only the value  of performance
to  the  other  party-the  same  information  it  currently  requires
under  the RD rule  to  determine  damages.  Thus,  the cost per case
may  be  the  same  as  under  the  RD  rule,  but  total litigation costs
are  likely to be  higher.
Let  us now consider  the effect  of the RD/Adjusted  Price rule
on  the  timing  of  performance  in  bankruptcy.  Under  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the  contract  price  would  sometimes  be
adjusted  in  the  event  the  trustee  chooses  performance.  Whether
the  adjustment  is  determined  by  the  court,  or  negotiated  by  the
parties  out-of-court,  the  process  of  determining  the  price  would
take time. The RD/Adjusted Price rule would thus appear to  delay
performance.
However,  the RD/Adjusted  Price rule  would not delay perfor-
mance  because  the rule  would  give  the  parties  the  incentive  and
the  ability  to  make  performance  decisions  even  before  the  final
price  is  ultimately  determined  (through  litigation  or  by  negotia-
tion).  To  see  why  this  is  the  case,  suppose  that  Firm  had  con-
tracted  with  Builder  for  construction  of  a factory  before  entering
bankruptcy.  Firm's  trustee  and  Builder  must  now make  their  re-
spective  performance  decisions. Under  the RD/Adjusted Price rule,
both parties would know  that the price  would be  adjusted  (down)
in favor of Firm's  estate to  the extent  that the  RD  rule would  re-
duce the cost  of rejection.
assume  that  the  payout  rate  for unsecured  claims  is  30%.
Under  the  RD  rule, the  cost  to Builder's  estate  of rejection  would  be  $15  (30%  of
$50,  Firm's expected  profit); performance  would  cost Builder  $20  ($120  - $100).  Since  the
RD  rule  would  reduce  the  cost  of rejection  by  $35,  from  $50  to  $15,  the  estate  has  an
incentive to  reject  even  though  the  contract  is  value-creating.
Under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule, the  cost  of rejection  would  be  reduced  by  $35,
from  $50  to  $15.  But  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  increase  the  contract  price  by
$35,  to  $135,  so  that  performance  would  now  benefit  Builder's  estate  by  $15  ($135  -
$120)  rather than  costing  it  $20.  Builder's  estate  thus  has  an  incentive  to  perform  under
the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule-the  desirable  outcome.
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To  begin,  consider the decisionmaking  process of Firm's trust-
ee.  Since  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  the  cost  of  perfor-
mance  (relative  to  the  ED  rule)  and  the  cost  of  nonperformance
(relative  to  the  ED  rule)  would  be  reduced  by  an  equal amount,
the amount by which  each would ultimately  be reduced  (which,  of
course,  could  be  zero)  becomes  irrelevant  to  the  trustee's
comparison  of  the  two  costs.  Thus,  in  comparing  the  cost  of
performance  and  the  cost  of  rejection  to  the  estate,  the  trustee
need  compare  only  the  cost  of  performance  under  the  ED  rule
and  the  cost  of  breach  under  the  rule  (the  identical  comparison
Firm would be required to make outside bankruptcy  under the ED
rule).  If the cost  of performance under the ED rule  would be  less
than the cost of breach  under the ED rule,  the trustee would have
an  incentive  to  seek  performance,  even  if  the  contract  price  has
not  yet  been  determined.  Otherwise,  the  trustee  would  have  an
incentive  to reject.
Decisionmaking  would  also  be  no  more  difficult  for  Builder
under the RD/Adjusted Price rule  than it would be  under the ED
rule.  Assume  that  Firm's  trustee  seeks  performance  and  Builder
must  decide  whether  to  begin  building  the  factory  or  to  breach.
Consider  two possibilities. The first is that Builder would have lost
money  under  the  original terms  of the  contract.  If Builder's  costs
are  such that it would have lost money under the original terms  of
the  contract,  then  outside  of  bankruptcy  Firm  would  not  have
been required  to  pay  damages  under the ED  rule  for breach,  the
RD rule would not reduce  the price  of nonperformance,  and there
would  be  no  price  adjustment  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.
Builder  would  face  the  same  decision  that  it  would  have  faced
outside bankruptcy  under the ED rule: it would determine  whether
to breach  or perform  by  comparing  its  cost  of performance  to  the
value  of performance  to the other party.
The  other  possibility  is  that  Builder  would  have  profited
under  the original terms  of the  contract. In  that  case  there  would
be  an  adjustment  in the  price  under  the RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.
However,  Builder  would  not  need  to  know  the  size  of  the
adjustment  in  order  to  decide  whether  to perform.  Whatever  the
size  of  the  adjustment,  Builder  would  be  better  off  performing
than breaching:  if Builder  would  have  profited  under  the  original
terms  of  the contract, it would also  profit under the RD/Adjusted
Price rule, because it  would be paid its  costs  plus a fraction (equal
to  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims)  of  its  expected  profits.
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On the other hand, if Builder refuses  to perform, it could  be liable
for expectation  damages  (based  on  the adjusted price).  Thus  when
Builder  would  have  made  a  profit  under  the  ED  rule  it  would
have  an incentive  to  agree  to performance  under the RD/Adjusted
Price even  before  the price is determined."'
If Builder responds  to the estate's  request for performance  by
initiating  performance,  the trustee may later seek  an adjustment  in
price  if  she  believes  that  Builder  would  have  profited  under  the
original terms  of the contract. At that point, the parties may settle
the  price  out  of  court  or  litigate  the  adjustment.  However,
performance  would  have  already  occurred  or be  under-way.  Thus,
any  litigation  over  the  price  of  performance  would  not  delay
performance  itself."  If  Builder  breaches,  Firm's  estate  could
seek expectation  damages  based  on the adjusted  contract price."z
In fact,  the RD/Adjusted  Price rule  could  lead to  earlier  per-
formance  decisions  by the parties  than  the  RD rule.  As  explained
above,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  enables  the  trustee  to  make
performance  decisions without requiring her to estimate the payout
rate for unsecured  claims.  In contrast,  when performance  is  costly,
the  RD  rule  requires  the  trustee  to  estimate  the  payout  rate for
unsecured claims in order  to compare  the cost  of rejection  and the
cost  of performance  to the estate.  Thus, under  the RD rule,  trust-
ees may  have  an  incentive  to  delay  decisionmaking  until they  can
form a better  estimate of the payout rate  (an incentive  they would
not have under the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule).
121.  Of course,  Builder  might  be hesitant to  agree to perform  the  contract  because  of
doubts about  the estate's  ability  to  perform  its  obligations.  But  this  situation  would  also
arise  under  the  RD  rule  when  the  trustee  seeks  performance.  The  Bankruptcy  Code
already  partially  addresses  this  problem  by  requiring  the  trustee  to  provide  "adequate
assurance"  that  the  estate  will  fulfill  its  obligations  under  the  contract  before  the  estate
may  assume  a  contract  with  respect  to  which  there  has  been  a  default.  See
§ 365(b)(1)(C)  (1994).
122.  In  contrast,  if  the  parties  must  renegotiate  the  contract,  desirable  performance
could  not  occur  until  the  parties  had  reached  agreement  on  the  new  performance  price.
Thus,  value-creating  contracts  that  the  trustee  has  an  incentive  to  reject  under  the  RD
rule  are  likely  to  be  performed,  if  at  all,  only  after  they  would  have  been  performed
under the  RD/Adjusted  Price rule.
123.  Builder  would  breach  only  if it  would  have  lost money  under  the  original  terms
of the contract.  In that  case, the  adjusted  price  that  would  have  been  faced  by  the  estate
in  the  event  of performance  is simply  the  original  price.
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3.  Distributional Effects  in  Bankruptcy  and  Performance
Decisions Prior to  Bankruptcy. The  distributional  effect  of  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  on  the  bankruptcy  estate  is,  on  average,
more favorable than the RD  rule. There  is less rejection under the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  than under  the  RD  rule  because  there is
no  incentive  to  reject  value-creating  contracts  (as  there  is  under
the  RD rule).  As  a result,  the benefit to  the estate  from rejection
is  likely  to  be  less  under the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  than  under
the  RD  rule.  However,  the  estate  also  benefits  under  the
RD/Adjusted  Price rule  whenever  the performance  price  is adjust-
ed-that  is,  whenever  there  is  performance  that makes  the  other
party  better  off.  The  benefit from  performance  would  more  than
offset  the reduction in the benefits  from rejection. 4
The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  also  affect  performance
decisions  prior  to  bankruptcy.  The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  could
have  two  types  of effects  on performance  decisions  prior  to  bank-
ruptcy. First, the rule  could give  a firm  anticipating bankruptcy  an
incentive  to  delay  performance  until bankruptcy  (rather than  per-
form  outside  of bankruptcy)  in order  to take  advantage  of a  price
adjustment." z  Second,  the  rule  could  give  a  firm  anticipating
bankruptcy  an  incentive  to  forego  breaching  a value-creating  con-
tract outside of bankruptcy in order  to take advantage  of the price
adjustment in bankruptcy. The rule  could  thus reduce  some  of the
inefficient  breach that takes  place outside  of bankruptcy  under the
RD rule.1 6
124.  In  those  cases  where  the  trustee  has  an incentive  to  reject  a  value-creating  con-
tract  under the  RD  rule,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  would  adjust  the  price  to provide  an in-
centive  for  the  trustee  to perform  the  contract.  The  trustee  would  choose  performance  if
it  makes  the  estate  better  off  than  rejection.  Thus,  in  those  cases  where  rejection  takes
place  under  the  RD  rule  but  would  not  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the  estate
would  be better  off  under the  latter  rule.  In addition,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would
transfer  more  value  to  the  estate  than the  RD  rule  in  some  of the  cases  where  perfor-
mance  would  occur  under  both  rules.
125.  When  the  other  party  is  not  expected  to  profit  from  performance,  the  firm  will
not  have  an  incentive  to  delay  performance  until  bankruptcy  because  there  will  be  no
price  adjustment.
126.  The  RD/Adjusted Price  rule  would  not  give the other  party  an incentive to  delay
breach  or  performance  until  bankruptcy.  Nor  would  either  party  have  an  incentive  to
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4.  A  Note  on  Fairness. The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  might
seem  unfair  to  the  nonbankrupt  party  relative  to  the  RD  rule
because it can transfer value  from that  party not only in the event
of  rejection  but also  in  the  event  of  performance.  This  objection,
which  can be raised  against  any of the three price-adjustment  rules
presented, would  of course have little force  if the terms of parties'
agreements  with  the  debtor reflect the legal rule  in effect and fully
compensate  the  parties  for  the  risk  of  loss  associated  with  the
debtor's  bankruptcy.  To  the  extent these  parties  are  compensated
for  any  increased  risk  of  loss  associated  with  a  price-adjustment
rule,  the  adoption  of  such  a  rule  would  not  make  these  parties
systematically  worse  off ex  ante.
Moreover,  even  from a  purely  ex post perspective,  the impact
in bankruptcy  of the  RD/Adjusted  Price rule  on  the nonbankrupt
party  would  be  much  more  limited  than  it  might  appear.  As  we
will  see,  relative  to  the  RD  rule  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  does
nothing  more  in  the  event  of  performance  than  to  reduce  the
profits  that  the  nonbankrupt  party  would  have  made  if the  con-
tract had  been performed  outside bankruptcy.
To  begin,  suppose  that  Builder,  the  nonbankrupt  party,  ex-
pects  to  profit from  performance  under  the  original  terms  of the
contract,  where  that  profit  is  the  amount  by  which  the  contract
price  exceeds  Builder's  cost  of  performance.  Under  the  ED  rule,
Firm would be required to pay Builder  100%  of that profit if Firm
breaches.  Under  the  RD  rule,  Firm's  estate  would  pay  a  smaller
percentage  of those damages.  The RD rule would therefore  reduce
the  cost  of  rejection  by  a  fraction  of  Builder's  profit,  where  that
fraction  is  the  difference  between  100%  and  the  percentage  of
damages  that must be paid under the RD  rule.
Under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the  performance  price
would  be  reduced  by  that same  fraction  of  Builder's  profit.  Since
the  adjustment  would  be  less  than  100%  of  Builder's  profit,  the
reduction  in  the  contract  price  would  not  eliminate  Builder's
profit-that  is,  it  would  not  lower  the  contract  price  below  the
cost  of  performance-but  merely  reduce  that  profit.  The
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  thus  would  not  convert  a  contract  that  is
profitable  for  Builder  into  one  that  is  money-losing.  Indeed,  as
long as  the payout rate  for unsecured  claims  is positive, under  the
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RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  Builder  would  enjoy  some  fraction  of the
profit it expected  from performance."z
Now  suppose that Builder  would  not have profited  from  per-
formance.  In  that  case  Builder  would  not  be  entitled  to damages
under  the  ED  rule  if  Firm  breaches.  The  RD  rule  would  not,
therefore,  reduce  the  cost  of  nonperformance  to  Firm's  estate.
Accordingly,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  not  adjust  the
price  of  performance  in  favor  of  Firm's  estate.  As  a  result,  if
Builder  would not  have  profited  from  performance  under the  ED
rule it would be no worse  off under  the RD/Adjusted Price  than it
would  be  under the  RD  rule  (or,  for that  matter, under  the  ED
rule  outside of bankruptcy)."
C.  The No-Damages/Adjusted Price Rule
1.  The  Operation of  ND/Adjusted  Price  Rule.  Since  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  just  discussed  builds  on-rather  than  re-
places-the  current RD rule,  it might  be  somewhat  easier  to  inte-
grate  into  existing  law  than  a rule  that  determines  rejection  dam-
ages  differently.  However,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  to  limit
consideration  to  rules  that  incorporate  the  principle  of  ratable
damages.  Suppose  one favored  a rule  that  sets  damages  in  a way
127.  Compare  Builder's  fate  to  that of a  contracting  party  that had  already  performed
and  was  awaiting  payment  on the  day  Firm  files  for  bankruptcy.  That  party  will not  only
give  up  any  profit  it had  expected  under  the  contract,  but  will  also  suffer  a  large  loss.
128.  The  following  example  provides  a  numerical  illustration  of how  the  RD/Adjusted
Price  rule  does  nothing  worse  to  the  nonbankrupt  party  (relative  to  the  RD  rule)  than
reduce  or eliminate  the  profit, if  any,  expected  under  the  contract.  Suppose  that  Builder
has  contracted  with  Firm  to  build  a  factory  for  $100,  and  the  expected  payout  rate  for
general  unsecured  claims  is  0%.
First  consider  the  case in  which  the  cost  of performance  to  Builder  would  be  $60.
In  the  event  of rejection,  the  loss  sustained  by  Builder  would  thus  be  $40  ($100  - $60)
but  Firm's  estate  would  be  required  to  pay  zero.  Thus  the  reduction  in  damages  would
be  $40.  The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  therefore  reduce  the  performance  price  by
$40,  yielding  an  adjusted  price  of  $60,  which  is  equal  to  Builder's  cost.  Builder  would
therefore  break  even  from performance.  (One  can see  that  if the  payout  rate  were  great-
er  than  0%,  Builder  would  enjoy  some  profit  from  performance  since  the  reduction  in
the  cost of rejection,  and  therefore  the  reduction  in  the  price,  would  be  less  than $40.)
Now  consider  the  same  case  as  above  except  that  Builder's  cost  of  construction
would  be  $150.  Builder  would  thus  stand  to  lose  $50  from  performance.  In  that  case,
Firm's  estate  would  not  be  required  to  pay  any  damages  upon  terminating  the  contract
under  either the  ED  or  RD  rules.  Thus,  the  reduction  in  damages  under  the  RD  rule
would  be  zero.  As  a  result,  no  adjustment  would  be  made  to  the  performance  price
under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price rule-and  Builder's  position  would  be no  worse  than  under
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that makes  the  bankruptcy  estate  even better  off  than  under  the
RD  rule.  There  is  a continuum  of damage  amounts  (one-half  rat-
able  damages,  one-third  ratable  damages,  and  so  on)  that  would
accomplish  this  result. The  simplest  rule, however, would  be a no-
damages  ("ND") rule that simply  bars the nonbankrupt  party from
receiving  any  rejection  damages.29
If damages  are reduced to  zero and  there is no  adjustment  of
the  performance  price,  there  would  of course  be  a  distortion  in
favor  of  rejection.  Indeed,  the  distortion  would  be  even  greater
than under the RD  rule  (in those cases  where the payout  rate  for
unsecured  claims  is  positive).  Under  the  ND  rule  the  bankruptcy
estate would have  an incentive  to reject  any contract  that makes it
worse  off,  no  matter  how  value-creating  performance  might  be.
Thus  there  would  be  less  value-creating  performance  under  the
ND  rule  than  under  the  RD  rule.3'  To  correct  the  distortion,
there  must  be  an  even  greater  price  adjustment  than  under  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.  As  we  will  see,  the  appropriate  adjust-
ment  is  one  that  would  reduce  the  contract  price  to  the  cost  of
performance.
131
Example.  To  illustrate  the  operation  of the  ND/Adjusted  Price
rule,  suppose  that  Firm  orders  a  factory  from  Builder  for  $100
and  then enters  bankruptcy. The  cost to Builder  of producing the
factory  would  be  $60.  Thus  its  anticipated  profits-and  the
amount  Firm  would  be  required  to  pay  in  damages  under  the
ED rule-is $40. The ND  rule would reduce  the cost  of rejection
by  $40  (to  $0).  Accordingly,  the price  of the factory  would  also
be reduced  by  $40,  to $60.  The  estate  would  then  face  a choice
between  purchasing  the  factory  for  $60  or  rejecting  and  paying
no damages?2
129.  The  ND  rule is used  in place  of the  RD  rule  in  a  number  of other  countries;  in
Italy, for  example,  the  ND  rule  is used  when  the  bankruptcy  estate  rejects  a  building  or
service  contract,  or  a  contract  for  delivery  of  property  to  the  nonbankrupt  party.  See
EUROPEAN  CORPORATE  INSOLVENCY,  supra note  29,  at  393.  In  Australia  the  ND  rule
applies  to  all  executory contracts  of the  debtor in  bankruptcy.  See  CAMPBELL,  supra note
29,  at 20.  The  ND  rule  is  also  the  de facto rule  in  the  many  U.S.  bankruptcy  cases  that
yield  no  payment  to  general  unsecured  creditors.  See  LoPucki,  supra note  14,  at 311.
130.  In Spain,  certain  contracts  automatically  terminate  when  a  firm  enters  bankruptcy
(apparently  leaving  neither  side  liable  for  any  damages).  See  EUROPEAN  CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY,  supra note  29,  at  605.  This  automatic  termination  rule  is  equivalent  to  a
bilateral  ND  rule  and  thus  creates  an  incentive  for  value-wasting  rejection  twice  as  fre-
quently  as  the  ordinary  ND  rule.
131.  If the nonbankrupt  party is  receiving  performance,  the price  is  adjusted  up to  the
value  that  party  places  on  performance.
132.  To  compare,  under  the  same  facts  and  assuming  a  30%  payout  rate,  the
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The  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  would work  on the  same princi-
ple  as  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.  Indeed,  it is  merely  a  special
case  of the RD/Adjusted Price rule-that in which the payout rate
is  expected  to  be  zero.  By  fixing  rejection  damages  at  zero,  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  reduces  the  cost  of  rejection  (relative  to
the cost  of breach under the ED rule)  by  an amount equal  to the
other party's  profits from  performance.  As  we saw,  to  ensure that
there  is no  distortion  against  or in favor  of performance,  the per-
formance  price must be adjusted  by same  amount as the reduction
in the cost  of rejection.  When the nonbankrupt  party  is  the seller,
reducing  the  contract  price  by the  seller's  expected  profits  would
have the effect of adjusting the contract price  to the seller's  break-
even point-its  cost.
Example.  Continuing  with  the  preceding  example,  suppose  that
performance  would  be  value-creating-i.e.,  that  Firm's  estate
would  value  the factory  at more than  $60.  In that  case,  purchas-
ing  the factory  for $60  would  make  the estate  better  off. On the
other  hand,  rejection  would  leave  the  value  of  the  estate  un-
changed. Thus  the trustee will  have  an incentive  to perform-the
desirable  outcome.
Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  that  performance  would  be
value-wasting-i.e.,  that  Firm's  estate  would  value  the  factory  at
less than  $60.  In that  case,  purchasing  the  factory  for $60  would
make  the estate  worse  off. Since  rejection  again leaves  the value
of  the  estate  unchanged,  the  trustee  has  an  incentive  to  re-
ject-the proper result.
2.  Litigation and the  Timing of Performance in  Bankruptcy.
Like  the  RD  rule,  the ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  could  give  rise  to
litigation  in the  event  the  other  party breaches.  However,  unlike
the RD rule, the ND/Adjusted  Price rule 1) would not give rise to
litigation  in  the  event  the  estate  rejects  but  2)  could  give  rise  to
litigation  in  the  event  of  performance.  The frequency of  litigation
could  be  higher  or lower  than under  the  RD  rule.33  In the  event
of litigation, the court need learn only the value  of performance  to
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  give  the  trustee  the  choice  between  paying  $72  for  the
factory  or $12  in  rejection  damages.
133.  The  frequency  of  litigation  would  be  lower  under  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule
than  under  the  RD  rule  if  rejection  under  the  RD  rule  is  more  frequent  than  those
cases  under  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  where  there  would  be  performance  and  the
trustee  seeks a  price  adjustment.
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the  other  party-the  same  information  currently  required  under
the RD  rule  to  determine  that party's  damages.  The  cost per case
may  therefore  be  the  same  as  under  the  RD  rule;  total litigation
costs could be higher  or lower than under  the RD  rule.
Since  the ND/Adjusted  Price rule  is  just a special  case  of the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  (that in  which  the payout  rate  for rejec-
tion  damages  claims  is  zero),  the  parties  would  have  the  same
incentive  and  ability  to  make  performance  decisions  prior  to  a
determination  of the performance  price  as under the RD/Adjusted
Price  rule.1"  As  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the  parties
would  need  less  information  to  make  decisions  than  they  would
under  the  RD  rule,  and no  more than  they  would  under  the  ED
rule. Thus performance  decisions could  be made more quickly  than
under the RD rule.
3.  Distributional Effects  in  Bankruptcy  and  Performance
Decisions Prior to  Bankruptcy.  From  an  ex  post  distributional
perspective,  there would be  a transfer from the nonbankrupt  party
to  the  estate  under  the  same  circumstances  as  the  RD/Adjusted
Price rule,  but the size of the transfer would  be greater  (except for
those  cases  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  where  the  payout
rate  for  unsecured  claims  would be zero  and  thus  the rules  would
be  effectively  the  same).  However,  it  should  be  emphasized  that
since  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  is simply  an  extreme  version  of
the  RD/Adjusted  Price rule,  it at most  would  eliminate  the  profit
the  other  party  would  have  enjoyed  under  the  original  terms  of
the  contract;  it  would  not  transfer  value  from  the  nonbankrupt
party to the  estate if the nonbankrupt  party  would have lost mon-
ey under the original  contract price.
The  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  could  have three  types  of effects
on  performance  decisions  prior  to  bankruptcy.  First,  like  the
RD/Adjusted  Price rule,  the ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  could  give  a
firm  anticipating  bankruptcy  an  incentive  to  delay  performance
until  bankruptcy  (rather  than  perform  outside  of  bankruptcy)  in
order  to  take  advantage  of  a  price  adjustment.3  Second,  like
the RD/Adjusted Price rule, the  ND/Adjusted  Price rule  could  also
134.  See supra Section  III.B.2.
135.  When  the  other  party  is  not  expected  to  profit  from  performance,  the  firm  will
not  have  an  incentive  to  delay  performance  until  bankruptcy  because  there  will  be  no
price  adjustment.
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reduce  some  of the  inefficient  breach  that takes  place  outside  of
bankruptcy  under  the  RD  rule  by  giving  a  firm  that  would  have
breached  outside  of bankruptcy  an incentive  to  defer  the decision
until bankruptcy  and  then  seek performance  at an  adjusted  price.
Third, unlike  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the ND/Adjusted  Price
rule  could  give  a  firm  anticipating  bankruptcy  an  incentive  to
delay breach until bankruptcy, where it could  reject without paying
any  damages.
D.  The Modified Price/Expectation Damages Rule
1.  The  Operation of the Modified Price/ED Rule.  The  RD/
Adjusted  Price  and  ND/Adjusted  Price  rules  take  the  level  of
damage  reduction as  given  (by the RD  and ND rules,  respectively)
and  then adjust  the price  of performance  accordingly  to  eliminate
the distortion  in favor of  rejection.  One problem  with this  type  of
approach  is that  it may  create  uncertainty  about  the  performance
price  prior  to  bankruptcy.  The  third  and  final  price  adjustment
rule  considered-the  "Modified  Price/Expectation  Damages"
("Modified  Price/ED")  rule-takes  a different  approach to  solving
the  problem  of  excessive  rejection  under  the  RD  rule:  it  adjusts
the price  of performance  in favor  of the estate by a fixed  percent-
age  that would  be  known  by  the  parties  when  they  initially  con-
tract,  and  sets  the  damage  payment  so  that neither  party  has  an
incentive  to  terminate  a  value-creating  contract.  The  adjustment
percentage  could  be chosen  in  any  number of  ways.  The  percent-
age  could  be the same  for all contracts  in all bankruptcy  cases,  or
it could  depend  on the type  of  contract  or case. For  concreteness,
however,  let  us  assume  that  the  adjustment  percentage  is  always
25%.
Example.  A  25%  Modified  Price/ED  rule  can  be  illustrated  as
follows.  Suppose  again  that  Builder has  agreed  to  build  Firm  a
factory  for  a  price  of  $100  and  that  Firm  subsequently  enters
bankruptcy.  Suppose  that  the  cost  of construction  would  be  $60
and that  Firm's estate  would  value  the factory  at $80.  Under the
25%  Price  Adjustment/ED  rule,  the  price  would  be  reduced  to
$75  ($100  - $25).
The parties  would  not  have  the proper  performance  incen-
tives  unless  a  party  refusing  to  perform  must  make  the  other
party  as  well  off  as  performance  would  have.  At  the  modified
price  of  $75,  Builder  would  lose  $15  ($75  - $60)  if Firm's  estate
rejects  and  Firm's  estate  would  lose  $5 ($80  - $75)  if  BuilderDUKE LAW JOURNAL
breaches.  Thus,  to  create  the  proper  performance  incentives,
Firm's  estate  would  be  required  to  pay  Builder  $15  (that  is,
Builder  would  have  a  priority  claim  for  $15)  if  Firm's  estate
rejects the contract  and  Builder would be required  to pay Firm's
estate  $5 if Builder  breaches.  The  performance  incentives  faced
by the  parties  would be  exactly  the  same  as  if the  contract  had
been  originally  priced  at  $75  and  the  ED  rule  applied  to  both
parties. 6
2.  Litigation and the  Timing  of Performance in Bankruptcy.
Like  the  RD  rule,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  give  rise  to
litigation  in  the  event  the  other  party breaches  or  the trustee  re-
jects.  However,  the  frequency  of  rejection  would  be  lower  than
under  the  RD  rule,  for  two  reasons.  First,  unlike  under  the  RD
rule,  there  would  be  no  value-wasting  rejection.  Second,  there
would  be  less  rejection  of  value-wasting  contracts  under  the
Modified  Price/ED  rule  than  under  the  RD  rule.  The  reason  for
this perhaps  surprising result is  as follows:  by adjusting the  price in
favor  of the estate, the Modified  Price/ED  rule would make  some
value-wasting  contracts  that would  have made the estate worse off
and  the  other  party  better  off  under  their  original  terms
unprofitable  for  both parties.  Under  the  RD  rule,  these  contracts
would  be  rejected  and  the  other  party  would  sue  for  damages.
Under  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule,  however,  both  parties  would
have  an  incentive  to  mutually  abandon  the  contract  without  any
litigation.  However,  although  the frequency  of rejection would  be
lower  under the Modified  Price/ED  rule  than under  the RD  rule,
the frequency  of breach by the nonbankrupt  party would  likely be
higher.  The  reason  that there  might be  more breach  by the  other
party under the Modified Price/ED  rule  than under the  RD rule is
that  modifying  the  price  in  favor  of  the  estate  might  cause  the
estate  to  seek  performance  of  value-wasting  contracts  that  the
parties  would  otherwise  have  mutually  abandoned.'37  The  fre-
136.  Each  of  the  other  two  price-adjustment  rules-the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  and
the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule-also  requires  a party  breaching  or rejecting  to put  the  other
in  the  same  position  as  performance  under  the  rule's  adjusted  price.
137.  To  see  how  this  might  occur,  suppose  that  under  the  original  contract  Builder
was  to  construct  a  factory  for  Firm  for  $100.  Suppose  that  at the  time  the  contract  was
to be performed,  it would  have  cost Builder  $120 to construct  the  factory  and  the  factory
would  have  had  a  value  of only  $80  to  Firm.  Since  the  contract  price  would  have  been
$100,  each party  would  be better  off abandoning  the  contract  and  there  would  be no  liti-
gation  over  damages.
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quency of  litigation  could  thus be  higher  or lower  than  under the
RD rule. In the event of litigation, the court  would be required to
learn  only  the  value  of  performance  to  the  injured  party-the
same information it currently requires  under the RD rule. The cost
per case  may  thus  be  the  same  as  under  the  RD  rule,  but  total
litigation costs could be higher  or lower.
Since  there  would be  no  litigation  in  connection with  perfor-
mance,  any  litigation that arises  would  not  delay performance.  In
fact,  as  under  the  other  two  price-adjustment  rules,  the  trustee
may  be  able  to  make  performance  decisions  more  quickly  than
under  the  RD  rule  because  she  would  not  need  to  estimate  the
payout rate  for  unsecured  claims  in  order  to  decide  whether  per-
formance  would  benefit the estate.
3.  Distributional Effects  in  Bankruptcy  and  Performance
Decisions Prior to  Bankruptcy.  The  distributional  effect  of  the
Modified  Price/ED  rule  relative  to  that  of the  RD  rule would  of
course  depend  on  the  price  adjustment  factor:  the  larger  the
factor,  the  more  the  rule  would  favor  the  bankruptcy  estate.
However,  two features  of the  rule  are worth  noting:  First, in  any
given case, the Modified Price/ED  rule could  make the bankruptcy
estate  better  off  or  worse  off  than  any  of  the  other  rules
(including  the  RD  rule).'38  Second,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule
would  benefit  the  estate  in  a  wider  variety  of circumstances  than
either  of the  other  two  price-adjustment  rules.  The  RD/Adjusted
Now  suppose  that  Firm  enters  bankruptcy  and  the  contract  price  is  adjusted  25%
in  Firm's  favor,  to  $75.  After  the  adjustment,  Firm  would  have  an  incentive  to  seek
performance.  Builder  would  then  face  a  choice  between  performing  (at  a  loss  of  $45
($120 - $75))  or breaching  (and  paying  $5 in  damages  ($80  - $75)).  Builder  would  choose
to  breach,  and  there  could  be litigation  over damages.
138.  To  illustrate,  suppose  that  Builder  agrees  to  construct  a  factory  for  Firm  for
$100,  the  cost  to  Builder  is  $60,  and  the  payout  rate  for  unsecured  claims  is 30%.  Under
the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  Firm's  estate  would  be given  a  choice  between  rejecting  and
paying  $12  in  damages  or  paying  $72 for  the  factory.  Under  the  25%  Modified  Price/ED
rule,  the  estate  would  have  the  choice  between  rejecting  and  paying  $25  in  damages  or
purchasing  the  factory  for $75.  Thus in  this case the  Modified  Price/ED  rule would  make
the  estate  worse  off  than under the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.
Now suppose  instead  that  the cost  to  Builder  of building  the  factory  would  be $80.
In  that case  the RD/Adjusted  Price rule would  permit  the  estate  either to  reject  and  pay
$6  (30%  of  $20)  or  purchase  the  factory  for  $86.  The  25%  Modified  Price/ED  rule,
however,  would  allow  the  estate  either  to  reject  and  pay  no  damages  (since  Builder
would  not have  profitted  from performance  at  a price  of $75)  or  purchase the  factory  for
$75.  Here  the  25%  Modified  Price/ED  rule  would  make  the  estate better  off  than  under
the RD/Adjusted  Price  rule.
563DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Price  and  ND/Adjusted  Price  rules  would  benefit  the  estate  only
when  the  other  party  would  gain  from  performance  under  the
original  terms  of  the  contract.  By  contrast,  the  estate  would  be
better  off  under the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  than  under  the  RD
rule  whenever  there  is  performance,  rejection,  or  breach  by  the
other  party, as  well  as  in  certain  cases  when  the parties  mutually
abandon the contract. 9
Let  us now consider  the  effect of the Modified  Price/ED rule
on  performance  decisions  outside  of  bankruptcy.  The  Modified
Price/ED  rule  could  delay performance  decisions  by  a party antici-
pating  bankruptcy  in  three  situations.  First, like the  ND/Adjusted
Price  and  RD/Adjusted  Price  rules,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule
could  give  a  firm  anticipating  bankruptcy  an  incentive  to  delay
performance  until  bankruptcy  (rather  than  perform  outside  of
bankruptcy)  in  order  to  take  advantage  of the  price  adjustment
(however,  unlike  under  the  other  two  price-adjustment  rules,  this
incentive  would  arise  whether  or not the  other party would  profit
from  performance).  Second,  like  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  and  RD/
Adjusted  Price  rules,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  reduce
excessive  breach  relative  to  the  RD  rule  by  giving  a  financially
distressed  firm that would  have breached  outside of bankruptcy  an
incentive  to  defer the decision  until bankruptcy  and then  perform.
Third,  like  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule,  but  unlike  the  RD/Ad-
justed  Price  rule,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  give  a  firm
anticipating  bankruptcy  an  incentive  to  delay  breach  until  bank-
ruptcy,  whenever  the  adjustment  would  make  rejecting  in  bank-
ruptcy  less  costly  than  breaching  prior  to  bankruptcy  (in  which
case  the  resulting  breach  claim  would  be  paid,  as  any  other
prebankruptcy  unsecured  claim, ratable  damages).
The  Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  also  cause  either  party  to
accelerate  breach  to  before  bankruptcy.  A  party  entering  bank-
ruptcy would have an incentive  to breach  before  bankruptcy  if the
cost of breach  outside bankruptcy  (payment  of ratable  damages)  is
139.  For  example,  if  Builder  agrees  to  build  Firm  a  factory  for  $100  and  Builder's
cost  of  construction  would  be  $120,  then  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  Builder
would  not  suffer  damages  from  rejection  by  Firm's  bankruptcy  estate.  Thus  the  adjust-
ment  to  the  performance  price  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  be  zero.  As  a
result,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  not  make  the  estate  better  off  than  the  RD
rule  whether  the  estates  seeks performance  or not.  In contrast,  a  25%  Modified  Price/ED
rule  would  reduce  the  price  to  $75.  This  in  turn  would  benefit  Buyer's  estate  if perfor-
mance  occurs  or  if Firm's estate  sues  Builder  for  breach.
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less  than  the  cost  of performance  or  rejection  inside  bankruptcy.
The other party  could  also  have  an incentive  to  breach  before  the
debtor  files  for  bankruptcy  if  the  other  party  expects  to  breach
inside  bankruptcy  or if the cost  of breach  under the  original price
is less than the cost of performance under the adjusted price. Thus
one  of  the  drawbacks  of  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  relative  to
the  RD  rule  is  that  it  could  increase  inefficient  breach  prior  to
bankruptcy.
4.  Another  Note  on  Fairness. The  RD/Adjusted  Price  and
ND/Adjusted  Price  rules  would  at  most  deprive  the  nonbankrupt
party of the profit it expected  under the original terms of the  con-
tract. In contrast, the Modified Price/ED rule  could turn a contract
under which the nonbankrupt party expected  to make a profit into
a  contract  under  which  it  suffers  a  loss.  The  Modified  Price/ED
rule  might  appear  even  more  vulnerable  to  a  fairness  objection
than  the  other  two  rules.  As  explained  earlier,  however,  con-
tracting parties  are likely to adjust their prices  so that, on average,
they are fully  compensated  for  any  expected  loss  from the  other's
bankruptcy."4  Thus  a  rule  such  as  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule
is-from  an  ex  ante  perspective-unlikely  to  make  the  parties
against which it is applied systematically  worse  off.
However,  even  from  an  ex  post  perspective,  forcing  the
nonbankrupt  party to take a loss on  the contract might not be  any
more  unfair  than  the  treatment  received  by  the  debtor's  other
unsecured  creditors.  A  party  to  an  executory  contract  with  the
bankrupt  debtor  that  is forced  to  perform  at  75%  of the  original
contract  price  (regardless  of  its  costs)  would  generally  still  be
better  off  than  other  parties  that  have  already  rendered  perfor-
mance  or  extended  credit  and  are  awaiting  (re)payment.  These
parties  may  recover  only  five  cents  on  the  dollar.14 " '  In  contrast,
a  party  that  has  been  promised  $100  for  performance  and  is
subject  to  a  25%  price  adjustment  receives  $75  for  performance.
The  only difference  between  this party  and one that receives  $5  of
the  $100  owed  to  it  for  performance  that  occurred  prior  to
bankruptcy  is  that  the  latter  has  performed  and  the  former  has
not. It is not clear why this  distinction should entitle the first party
140.  See supra Section  III.B.4.
141.  See supra note  14.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
to be  paid more  than  75  cents  on  the  dollar while  the party  that
has  already performed  is  paid  only five cents  on the dollar.
IV.  Ex  ANTE EFFECrS  OF  MAKING  EXECUTORY  CONTRACT
RULES  MORE  FAVORABLE  TO  THE  BANKRUPTCY  ESTATE
The  focus  of  this Article  has  been  on  the effect  of the  treat-
ment  of executory contracts  on performance  decisions in bankrupt-
cy.  Part  I  explained  why  the  currently  used  RD  rule  sometimes
provides  an  incentive  for trustees to  reject value-creating  contracts
in  bankruptcy.  Part II  considered  the possibility  of  preventing  the
trustee  from  rejecting value-creating  contracts  in  bankruptcy.  Part
III  then  presented  three  price-adjustment  rules  each  of which,  in
principle,  could  eliminate  any  incentive  to  reject  value-creating
contracts  in the first instance.
Of course,  the treatment  of executory  contracts  in bankruptcy
affects  more than just performance  decisions in bankruptcy.  As we
saw  in  Part  III, the  executory  contracts  rule  also  affects  the  fre-
quency  (and  total  costs)  of  litigation  and  the  timing  of  perfor-
mance  decisions  by  the  trustee. The  rule  also  affects  performance
decisions  by both  parties  in anticipation  of bankruptcy.
This  Part considers  other ex ante effects  that could  arise  from
adopting  one  of the price-adjustment  rules  presented  and analyzed
in  Part  III  (or, indeed,  any  rule  that  would  tend  to  be  more  fa-
vorable  to  the  bankruptcy  estate,  and less  favorable  to  the  other
party,  than  the  RD  rule).  I  first  consider  how  making  the  treat-
ment  of  executory  contracts  in bankruptcy  more favorable  to  the
estate  might  affect parties'  incentives  to enter  bankruptcy  (Section
A). Next,  I consider  how making  the  executory  contract  rule less
favorable  to  the  nonbankrupt  party  might  affect  the  ability  of
firms-particularly  those  in  financial  distress-to  enter  into  con-
tracts  (Section B). The analysis  offered below suggests that making
executory  contract  rules  more  favorable  to  the bankruptcy  estate
(and  less  favorable  to  the  nonbankrupt  party)  need  not  unde-
sirably  increase the use of bankruptcy  or make it more  difficult  for
firms  to enter into value-creating  contracts.
Before proceeding, it should be emphasized  that this Part does
not  attempt  to  identify  and  explore  all  of  the  possible  ex  ante
effects  of making  executory  contract  rules  more  favorable  to  the
estate.'  Nor  does  it  aim  to  resolve  fully  the  issues  that  are
142.  For  example,  I do  not  consider  the  effect  of making  these  rules  more  favorable
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raised. Rather this Part, like the remainder  of this Article, seeks to
identify  and  briefly  explore  some  of the  issues  that must  be  con-
sidered  in  selecting  the  appropriate  treatment  of  executory  con-
tracts  in bankruptcy.
A.  The Incentive to File for Bankruptcy
The three price-adjustment  rules-the RD/Adjusted  Price rule,
the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule,  and  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule-
would sometimes  be more favorable  to  the bankruptcy  estate  than
the  RD  rule.  One  might  be  concerned  that  adoption  of  any  of
these  three rules  could lead to  an undesirable increase  in the num-
ber of firms  entering  bankruptcy in order  to take advantage  of the
rule.
143
Whether  or  not  an  increase  in  the  number  of  bankruptcy
filings  would  be  undesirable  is  an  open  question.  In  fact,  it  is
widely  believed  that  too  few  firms  file  for  bankruptcy  and  that
those  that  file  often  do  so  too  late.'  The  problem  is  that  the
people who make the filing  decision, the debtor's managers, usual-
ly do not expect to capture much of the efficiency  gain that would
arise  from  an  earlier  (and  perhaps  more  orderly)  liquidation  or
reorganization  in  bankruptcy.  Instead,  it  is  typical  for  managers
who  bring  their  firms  into  bankruptcy  to  lose  their  jobs.4  Man-
agers  thus  can  have  an  incentive  to take  extreme-and  often val-
ue-wasting-measures  to keep  their  firms  out of bankruptcy.  Con-
sequently,  any  increase  in  bankruptcy  filings  that  resulted  from
adoption  of  one  of  these  price-adjustment  rules  might  in  fact  be
desirable.
But whether or not an increase  in bankruptcy  filings would be
desirable,  adoption  of  a price-adjustment  rule  may  well  not  have
much  of  an  effect  on  bankruptcy  filings,  for  the  following  three
reasons.  First,  the  amount  of  value  that  a  price-adjustment  rule
would  transfer  to  the  bankruptcy  estate  relative  to  the  RD  rule
would  often  be  rather  limited.  Consider  the  RD/Adjusted  Price
to  the  bankruptcy estate  on the  parties'  willingness  to  engage  in  reliance.
143.  By  threatening  to  enter  bankruptcy  and  invoke  a  price-adjustment  rule,  a  firm
might  be  able  to  use  the  rule  to  negotiate  more  favorable  concessions  outside  of  bank-
ruptcy  than  under the  RD  rule.  Thus,  a  firm need  not  enter  bankruptcy  to  take  advan-
tage  of a  more  favorable  executory  contracts  rule.
144.  See  Warren,  supra note  105,  at 794-95;  Baird, supra note  80,  at 230-31.
145.  See  infra note  150  and  accompanying  text.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
rule.  Relative  to  the RD  rule,  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule would
make  the  bankruptcy  estate  better  off  only  when,  under  the RD/
Adjusted Price rule, there is  performance at an adjusted  price: that
is,  only  when  performance  would  be  value-creating  and  make  the
other party  better  off." 4  When  there  is  performance  at  an  adjust-
ed price,  the size  of the  transfer  would be  limited to  the  discount
the  RD  rule  provides  for  rejection.  This  discount,  in  turn,  would
not be  greater  than  100%  of the profit that the  other party would
have  made  from  performance  under  the  original  terms  of  the
contract  (which  itself  would  be  typically  only  a  fraction  of  the
contract  price).  And  to  the extent  that  there  is  a  positive  payout
for  unsecured  claims,  the  adjustment  would be  less than  100%  of
this  profit. 47
Second,  even  if  a  price-adjustment  rule  would  benefit  the
bankruptcy  estate  (relative  to  the  RD  rule),  those  making  the
decision  whether  to  file  for  bankruptcy-the  debtor's  manag-
ers-would  not be  able  to  avail  themselves  (as  shareholders  or  as
employees)  of most of that benefit. The managers  of  course would
benefit  to  the  extent  that  the  extra  value  made  available  to  the
estate  increases  the  likelihood  that  they  can  retain  their  jobs,  or
boosts  the  value  of any  equity  that they may  hold after  the  reor-
ganization.  But  much  of  the  increase  in  value  would  simply  be
redistributed  to  other  participants  in  the  bankruptcy  proceeding,
particularly  the  debtor's  unsecured  creditors,  whose  claims  will
have  priority  over  those  of  shareholders."~  The  managers'  share
146.  Performance  would  not  occur  if it  is  value-wasting  and  there  would  be  no  adjust-
ment  to the  price  if the  other party  would  be  made  worse  off by  performance.
147.  The  other  two  price-adjustment  rules  could  also  make  the  bankruptcy  estate
better  off  than  under  the  RD  rule,  but  by  a  greater  amount  and  in  a  larger  range  of
cases.  Like  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  make  the
estate  better  off  than  under  the  RD  when  there  is  performance  at  an  adjusted  price.
However,  the  adjustment  would  be  greater  under  the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule  (except  in
those  cases  where  the  payout  rate  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  be  zero,  in
which  case  the  adjustment  would  be  the  same).  Unlike  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  the
ND/Adjusted  Price  rule would  also  make  the  estate  better  off than  under  the  RD rule  in
the  event  of  rejection  (except  in  those  cases  where  the  payout  rate  under  the
RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  would  be  zero,  in  which  case  the  rules  would  have  the  same
effect on  the  estate  in  the  event  of rejection).
The  Modified  Price/ED  rule  would  make  the  estate  better  off  than  under  the  RD
rule  whenever  there  is  performance,  breach  by  the  other  party,  or  a  situation  in  which
application  of  the  rule  would  lead  to  the  mutual  abandonment  of  a  contract  that  the
trustee  would  otherwise  have  been  required  to  reject.  Depending  on  the  adjustment  per-
centage,  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  make  the  estate  better  off  or  worse  off  than
under  the  RD  rule  when there  is rejection.
148.  This  raises  the  possibility  that, under  a  price-adjustment  rule,  unsecured  creditors
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of  the  extra  value  made  available  by  a  price-adjustment  rule,  if
any, would therefore tend to  be small. 49
Third,  even if the  people who  are making the decision  wheth-
er  to  file  for  bankruptcy  could  capture  some  of  the  extra  value
that would  be made  available  through  these rules,  they would  not
have  an  incentive  to  enter  bankruptcy  if  the  cost  bankruptcy  im-
poses  on  them  is  greater  than  their  share  of the  value.  Manage-
ment  can  face  two  types  of  costs  in  bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy  may
indirectly  impose  costs  on  managers  by reducing  the  value  of the
business  as  a  whole. The  proceeding  may  reduce  the  value  of the
firm by imposing reputational  and legal costs  on the firm, diverting
managers'  time  from  running  the  business,  and  reducing  the
business'  flexibility.  These  costs  will  be  borne,  in  part,  by  the
managers  as  employees  or  shareholders  of  the firm.  In  addition,
bankruptcy  may  directly  impose  costs  on managers  by  preventing
them  from  taking  steps  to  boost  equity  value  at  the  expense  of
creditors,  forcing  them  to  give  up salary  or perquisites,  or  ending
their  control  (and  ownership)  of  the  business. 5'  This  is  not  to
say  that managers  could  not benefit  from  a price-adjustment  rule
once  they  are  in bankruptcy;  the point  is  that  in many  cases  the
extra value that managers could  capture  as a result  of the use  of  a
price-adjustment  rule  would  not  be  sufficient  to  make  it  worth-
while to  file for bankruptcy  when there  is another  option.
could  have  an  increased  incentive  to push  firms into  bankruptcy.  In principle,  sophisticat-
ed  creditors  with  large  claims  and  sufficient  information  about  a  debtor's  contracts  to  be-
lieve  that they  would  benefit  from  application  of  the  price-adjustment  rule  would  have  an
increased  incentive  to  push  the  debtor  into  bankruptcy.  However,  existing  law  makes  it
difficult  and  risky  for  creditors  to  initiate  involuntary  bankruptcy  proceedings.  Thus,  in
practice,  adoption  of a  price-adjustment  rule  is unlikely  to  have  a significant  effect  on  the
number  of involuntary  filings.
149.  In principle,  managers  could  capture  more of the  increase  in  value resulting  from
application  of  a  price-adjustment  rule  in  those  cases  where  all  of  the  other  claimants
would be paid  in  full (as  a  result  of application  of the  rule).  This  would  not  occur  under
the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule:  if  the  payout  rate  for  secured  claims  were  100%,  there
would  be  no  price  adjustment  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  (and  therefore  no  in-
crease  in  value  available  to  the  estate  resulting  from  application  of the  rule).  However,
the  ND/Adjusted  Price  rule and  the Modified  Price/ED  rule  could  both  benefit the  estate
in  some  cases where  all  unsecured  claims  are  paid in  full.
150.  See  Susan  Rose-Ackerman,  Risk  Taking  and  Ruin:  Bankruptcy and  Investment
Choice, 20  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  277,  278  n.3  (1991).  If they  do  not lose  their jobs,  they  may
find  their  decisions  subject  to  judicial  scrutiny.  See  Baird,  supra note  80,  at  227.  The
court  may  also  reduce  compensation  to  management.  See  In re  Anglo  Energy  Ltd.,  41
B.R.  337,  341  (Bankr.  S.D.N.Y.  1984)  (denying  assumption  of employment  contracts  with
key  personnel  because  assumption  was  not necessary  to  preserve  the  estate).DUKE LAW JOURNAL
B.  The Ability of Firms to Enter Contracts
The three  price-adjustment  rules-the RD/Adjusted  Price, the
ND/Adjusted  Price,  and the  Modified  Price/ED  rule  would  some-
times  be  less  favorable  to  the  nonbankrupt  party  than  the  RD
rule.15  A  price-adjustment  rule  would  therefore  increase  the  risk
of loss  that  arises  from  the  possibility  that  the  other  party  to  a
contract  will  enter  bankruptcy  while the  contract  is still  executory.
When  the  contracting  parties  are  relatively  sophisticated  (as  is
usually the  case when  the contract is between  two  businesses)  and
the  amounts  at stake  are  large  enough,  this  increased  risk  of loss
would  be reflected  in the  terms  of  the initial  contract.  For  exam-
ple,  firms  facing  a  high  risk  of  insolvency  might  be  required  to
offer  even more favorable  terms  to their  contractual  partners  than
they  do  currently  in  order  to  compensate  for  this  increased  risk.
As  a  result,  adoption  of  any  of  these  three  rules  could  make  it
more  difficult  for  firms-especially  those  in  financial  distress-to
enter into  contracts.
Making  it  more  difficult  for  financially  distressed  firms  to
enter  into contracts with sophisticated  parties would not necessarily
be  undesirable.  First,  not  all  contracts  are  value-creating.  The
owners  of  a  firm  will  sometimes  have  an  incentive  to  engage  in
high-risk  activities  that  increase  the expected  value  of their  equity
but  reduce  the  value  of  creditors'  claims  by  an  even  greater
amount. This incentive  can  become especially strong  when the firm
is  financially  distressed.'  Under  these  conditions  the  owners
have  little to  lose from  betting the firm's  assets  (because  they are
likely to lose control  of the firm if they  do not gamble)  and much
to  gain.  Thus  if  a  modification  of  the  executory  contracts  rule
would  make  it  more  difficult  for  financially  distressed  firms  to
enter into contracts, the effect  would,  in some cases,  be  desirable.
151.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  when  a  price-adjustment  rule  would  yield  an  out-
come  that  is  more  favorable  to  the  bankruptcy  estate  than  the  RD  rule,  it  would  not
necessarily  make  the  other  party  worse  off  than  under  the  RD  rule  by  an  offsetting
amount.  When  there  is  performance  under  a  price-adjustment  rule  of  a  contract  that
would  have  been  rejected  under  the  RD rule,  part  or  all  of the  gain to  the  estate  would
represent  the  efficiency  gain  from  performance,  which  would  not come  at  the  expense  of
the  other  party.  Under  the  Modified  Price/ED  rule,  there  would  be  situations  in  which
application  of  the  rule  would  actually  leave  both  parties  better  off  than  under  the  RD
rule.
152.  See  Credit  Lyonnais  Bank  Nederland  v.  Pathe  Communications  Co.,  No.  12150,
1991  Del.  Ch.  LEXIS 215,  at *107-09  (Del.  Ch.  1991).
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The  second  reason  why  it  may  be  desirable  to  increase  the
risk  faced  by sophisticated  contracting  parties  who contract  with  a
financially-distressed  firm is that it could  encourage  more desirable
"monitoring"  of  the  distressed  firm.53  The  effect  of  adoption  of
a price-adjustment  rule might be to  give sophisticated parties more
incentive  to  seek  terms  that reduce  the  likelihood  that  the  other
party  will  fail and therefore  be  unable to perform or pay damages
in  full."  The  presence  of  such  terms  might  make  a  value-creat-
ing  contract  even more  efficient. Thus  even  with respect to  value-
creating  contracts,  increasing  the  risk  of  loss  faced  by  the  other
party  may have desirable  effects.
However,  adoption of a price-adjustment rule may not make it
that  much  more  difficult  for  higher-risk  firms  to  enter  into  con-
tracts  for  two reasons.  First,  a price-adjustment  rule  need not sig-
nificantly  increase  the risk  of loss  associated  with contracting  with
a financially  distressed  firm.  Much of the risk  associated  with  such
contracting  is independent  of the treatment  of executory  contracts
in bankruptcy.  There is  the risk that the financially  distressed firm
will  enter bankruptcy  after the  other party  has  performed  or paid
(at least  in part) but before  the  other party  has received  payment
or  performance  from  the  firm  entering  bankruptcy.  In  that  case
the nonbankrupt  party  could  suffer  a loss  as  great as  the value  of
the  entire  contract. There  is  also  the risk  that  the financially  dis-
tressed  firm  will breach  before  entering  bankruptcy.  In  that  case
the  nonbankrupt  party  could  suffer  a  loss  equal  to  its  expected
profits,  if any. In both cases,  of course, the amount of the loss will
depend  on the  payout  rate  for unsecured  claims.  The  higher  the
payout rate, the lower the loss will be.
The treatment  of executory  contracts  in bankruptcy  affects the
risk of loss faced by  a contracting  party  only to the extent  that the
contract  is  expected  to  be  executory  should  the  other party  enter
bankruptcy.  Thus, for  example,  the  RD  rule itself  imposes  a  loss
upon  the  nonbankrupt  party  only  if  1)  the  other  party  enters
bankruptcy;  2)  the contract  is  still executory  when  the  other party
enters  bankruptcy;  3)  the  nonbankrupt  party  would  profit  from
performance;  and  4)  the bankrupt  party chooses  to  reject. In that
153.  For  an  elaboration  of  this  argument  in  the  context  of  loan  contracts,  see
Bebchuk  &  Fried, supra note  86,  at 904-13.
154.  See  Nimmer, supra note  6,  at 521.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
case,  the amount  of loss  would be  the nonbankrupt  party's profits
(less whatever  ratable  damages it receives).
Under  a price  adjustment rule  such  as the  RD/Adjusted Price
rule, the risk of loss faced  by  a contracting  party would be  higher
than  under  the  RD  rule  only  when,  ceteris paribus: 1)  the  other
party  is  expected  to  enter  bankruptcy;  2)  the  contract  is  likely  to
be  executory  when  the  other  party  enters  bankruptcy;  3)  the
nonbankrupt  party  would  profit  from  performance;  and  4)  the
party in  bankruptcy  would  be  expected  to  perform  under  the  RD
rule.  Depending  on  the  circumstances,  this  increase  in  risk  could
be  small  relative  to  the  total  risk  that the  contracting  party  faces
under  the  RD  rule  (including  the  risk  that  performance  will  be
rendered  before  the  other  party  pays  and  the  risk  that  the  other
party will breach  outside of bankruptcy).
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The  second  reason  why  a  price-adjustment  rule  need  not
make  it  much  more  difficult  for  financially  distressed  firms  to
enter  into  executory  contracts  is  that,  even  if such  a  rule  would
marginally increase  the risk of loss associated  with contracting  with
financially  distressed  firms,  the  rule  would  allow  financially  dis-
tressed firms to negotiate better terms with  other creditors, making
it easier  to pay  the higher risk premium  demanded  when  entering
into executory  contracts.  In  particular,  since  the  effect  of  a  price-
adjustment  rule  is  mostly  to  transfer  value  among  different  unse-
cured  claimamts,  to  the extent  that  a  price-adjustment  rule  would
increase  the risk  of  loss faced  by  certain  parties,  it  would reduce
the  risk  of  loss  faced  by  creditors  with  unsecured  claims.  To  the
extent  that  these  creditors  could  "adjust"  the  interest  rate  they
charge  the  firm  to  reflect  the  effect  on  them  of  the  executory
contract  rule  in  place, 6  they  would  lend  on  terms  that  reflect
their lower  risk of loss,  and a price-adjustment  rule would make it
155.  To  be sure,  a  price  adjustment  rule  could  have  a number  of  other effects  on  the
risk  of loss  faced  by  contracting  parties.  Most  of these  effects  could  in  principle,  either
increase  or decrease  the  risk  of loss. For  example,  a  price-adjustment  rule  may  affect  the
choice  of  the  firm's  projects  ex  ante, the  timing  of  performance,  and  so  on.  However,
some  of the  effects  of a  price-adjustment  rule  will  always  tend  to  reduce  the  risk of loss
associated  with  contracting  with  a financially  distressed  firm.  For example,  the  payout rate
for unsecured  claims  is likely  to  be  higher  under  the  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule  than  under
the RD  rule.
156.  Lucian  Bebchuk  and I  introduced  the  term  "adjusting"  to describe  a  creditor  that
adjusts  the  terms  of its  bargain  with  the  debtor  to  reflect  the  effect  on  that  creditor  of
the debtor's  arrangements  with  other  creditors.  See Bebchuk  &  Fried,  supra note  86,  at
864.
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easier  for  financially  distressed  firms  to  enter  into  contracts  with
these  creditors.  This  would  reduce  the  effective  cost  of  entering
into  contracts  with parties  that  are  likely  to be  adversely  affected
ex post by the rule.
The  RD/Adjusted  Price  rule,  for  example,  would  make  the
firm's  other creditors  better off than under the RD rule,  since the
value  of  the  bankruptcy  estate  would  generally  be  higher  than
under  the RD  rule.  Thus,  if the firm's  other  creditors  are  adjust-
ing,  they  would,  everything  else  equal,  charge  less  interest  under
the RD/Adjusted Price  rule than under  the RD  rule. So  while  the
firm  would  be  required  to  pay  a  higher  price  to  enter  into  con-
tracts  under  the RD/Adjusted  Price rule  than  under the  RD  rule,
its  creditors,  to  the  extent  they  are  adjusting,  would  charge  less
interest.57
CONCLUSION
This Article has  carried  out  an economic  analysis  of the treat-
ment  of  executory  contracts  in  bankruptcy.  The  analysis  demon-
strated  that  the  long-standing  and  widely-used  rule  of  "ratable
damages"-which  permits  the bankruptcy  trustee to reject executo-
ry  contracts  of  the  debtor  without  fully  compensating  the  other
party for  any  resulting  loss--can  provide  the  trustee  with  the  in-
centive  to reject value-creating  contracts.
The  Article  then  offered  a  preliminary  analysis  of  two  ap-
proaches  to  eliminating  the  problem  of  excessive  rejection  under
the ratable  damages  rule. One  approach, which would build on the
existing  but  rarely-used  "balancing  test"  doctrine,  would  bar  the
trustee  from rejecting  contracts when the harm to the nonbankrupt
party  is  greater  than  the  benefit  to  the  estate.  The  Article  ex-
plained  that  such  an  approach  may  not  be  desirable  because  it
would undermine the bankruptcy norms of rehabilitation and  equal
157.  In fact,  since  the  RD/Adjusted  Price rule  would  increase  the total  value  available
to  all  of  the  parties-and  thus  increase  the  firm's  creditors'  share  of the  pie  by  more
than  it  reduces  the  contracting  party's  share-the  reduction  in  the  interest  charged  the
firm  would  be  greater  than  the  increase  in  the  price  the  firm  must  pay  to  enter  con-
tracts.  Thus,  in  a  world  where  all  creditors  were  perfectly  adjusting,  the  RD/Adjusted
Price  rule would  on balance  reduce  the  costs faced  by  the  firm  and  allow it to  enter  into
more  value-creating  contracts.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
treatment,  and  could  be  circumvented  by  a  firm  breaching  such
contracts  prior  to filing for bankruptcy.
The  other  approach  examined-the  "price  adjustment"  ap-
proach-would  allow  the trustee  to  decide  whether  to  perform  or
reject  an executory  contract, but would  adjust the terms  of perfor-
mance  in favor of the bankruptcy  estate  in order  to  eliminate  any
incentive  to  reject  value-creating  contracts.  The  Article  put  for-
ward  and  analyzed  three  price-adjustment  rules.  These  rules  were
compared  along  a number  of different  dimensions-the  amount  of
litigation  likely  to be  associated  with  each rule,  the  effect  of each
rule  on the timing  of performance  decisions in bankruptcy,  ex post
distributional  consequences,  and the effect  of each rule  on perfor-
mance  decisions  prior to  bankruptcy.
Finally,  the  Article  explained  how  a  price-adjustment  rule
would  affect  certain  other  decisions  by  the parties  prior  to  bank-
ruptcy.  The  Article  considered  two  ex  ante  effects  of  adopting  a
rule,  such  as  a  price-adjustment  rule,  that  would  make  the  treat-
ment  of  executory  contracts  more  favorable  to  the  bankruptcy
estate:  the  effect  of  such  a  change  on  the  incentive  to  file  for
bankruptcy;  and  the  effect  of  such  a  change  on  the  ability  of
firms-particularly  those  in  financial  distress-to  enter  into  con-
tracts.  The analysis  suggested  that making  the treatment  of execu-
tory contracts  in bankruptcy  more favorable  to the estate need not
lead  to  an  undesirable  increase  in  bankruptcy  filings  nor  make  it
difficult  for  financially  distressed  firms  to  enter  into  executory
contracts.
The  analysis  in  this  Article  is  in  many  respects  preliminary.
My  aim has  been to  explain  a problem  with  the  current  treatment
of  executory  contracts  and  to  put  forward  and  begin  to  analyze
various  approaches  for  remedying  that  problem.  More  work  re-
mains  to  be  done  before  the  best  approach  can  be  identified.  I
hope  that my  analysis  provides  a foundation  for such an  effort.
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